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INTRODUCTION 
The persistence of housing discrimination more than forty years 
after the passage of the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 19681 is 
among the most intractable civil rights puzzle.  For the most part, this 
puzzle is not doctrinal:  the Supreme Court has interpreted the FHA 
only a handful of times over the last two decades—a marked contrast 
to frequent doctrinal contestations over the statutory scope and con-
stitutionality of federal laws governing employment discrimination 
and voting rights.2  Instead, the central puzzle is the inefficacy of the 
FHA’s enforcement regime given that, in formal terms, the regime is 
the strongest of any civil rights statute.3  Repeated studies document 
high levels of racial discrimination particularly in the rental market, 
and particularly against African Americans and people with dark 
skin.4  If the fundamental question of the current post-civil rights era 
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Hochman, Tarek Ismail, Jessica Leinwand, Temilola Sobowale, and Jennifer Wertkin of 
the Columbia Law Library for wonderful research assistance. 
 1 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–819, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2006)). 
 2 The Supreme Court has decided only four cases interpreting the FHA since 1988, most 
recently in Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003).  By contrast, over that same time period 
the Court has entertained more than thirty cases interpreting provisions of Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (hold-
ing that the city of New Haven’s decision to reject firefighters’ promotion test results to 
avoid disparate impact liability violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 3 See text accompanying notes 79–83 infra (describing strengthening of the FHA in 1988). 
 4 See WILLIAM APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING:  EXPANDING THE ABILITY OF RENTAL 
HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 23 (2004), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf (noting exis-
tence of housing discrimination in the rental market); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., 
DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS:  NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I 
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is why racial inequality persists despite federal civil rights laws and 
positive changes in popular attitudes and norms around race,5 the 
case of housing discrimination is both simpler and more complex 
than in other areas of civil rights law.  The question in housing is not 
simply the emergence of more subtle, nuanced forms of “second-
generation” discrimination.6  Instead, what is striking about housing 
has been the stickiness of quite ordinary forms of discrimination:  re-
fusals to rent, sell or make properties available to blacks on the same 
basis as whites.7  Data on housing discrimination reveals some im-
provement since the passage of the FHA, but rental discrimination 
and steering have endured at high levels.8 
These dismal statistics lead fair housing commentators to question 
the essential power and value of the FHA’s enforcement system, and 
of law’s capacity to remedy housing discrimination.  Commentators 
contrast the marked failure of the FHA with the relative success of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act (the FHA’s watershed statutory predecessor)9 in 
eradicating intentional discrimination in public accommodations and 
employment.10  The FHA, according to one prominent commentator, 
 
HDS 2000, at i–iv (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/
phase1_report.pdf (finding that African Americans and Hispanics face discrimination 
when they search for rental housing in metropolitan markets nationwide); see also Robert 
G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 506–07 (2007) (noting that housing, unlike employment, still suf-
fers from “first generation” problems of “blatant racial discrimination”). 
 5 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
3 (1987) (reflecting on how racial inequalities still persist and suggesting potential reme-
dies for them); RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE:  A CRITIQUE 170–71 (2005) 
(documenting disillusion by many civil rights advocates and commentators with civil 
rights laws and institutions, and arguing that civil rights are a “limited mechanism” for so-
cial justice).  
 6 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462–63 (2001) (providing a framework for addressing “second gen-
eration” employment discrimination:  workplace structures and interactions that, over 
time, exclude nondominant groups); see also Schwemm, supra note 4, at 506–07 (describ-
ing housing as still dominated by “first generation” questions). 
 7 See infra text accompanying notes 40–44. 
 8 See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 9 See STEVEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW:  THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 4 (1995) (describing the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a “wa-
tershed” moment in American history).  See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN 
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7 (2010) (de-
scribing the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a “superstatute”:  a law which over time instantiates 
public values and establishes new constitutional norms). 
 10 See Schwemm, supra note 4, at 459–60. (“The continuing high degree of noncompliance 
with the FHA stands in sharp contrast to the experience in other areas of American life 
governed by federal civil rights laws.”); see also Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A 
Missing Piece:  Fair Housing and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841, 905 (2005) (not-
ing the particularly “intractable” nature of housing discrimination). 
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has proven to be a “failed treatment,” defying the primary assumption 
of the civil rights enforcement model that litigation will deter dis-
crimination.11  Commentators despair that housing is in essential ways 
“different from other civil rights issues”12:  the one area of civil rights 
in which the possibility of change “is viewed as most remote.”13 
This Article contends that this despair may rest on overly narrow 
conceptions of the FHA’s enforcement power.  The governing ap-
proach to improving FHA enforcement involves strengthening the 
capacity of the federal administrative regime to prosecute and resolve 
claims and of the private bar to conduct fair housing litigation.  Im-
proving public and private capacity to resolve discrimination claims 
was the theory driving Congress’s Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988,14 and close observers of the system’s post-1988 failures have ar-
gued for a range of additional statutory and policy changes to im-
prove this enforcement scheme.15 
The FHA, however, also provides an additional mechanism for 
promoting fair housing, focused not on the resolution of individual 
discrimination claims, but which requires federal agencies to use 
their powers “affirmatively to further” fair housing (AFFH).16  This 
provision provides a potentially important route for achieving the sta-
tute’s goals of promoting residential choice and integration.17  My 
 
 11 Schwemm, supra note 4, at 456. 
 12 Rubinowitz & Alsheik, supra note 10, at 907. 
 13 John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found:  The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1067, 1071 (1998); see also Charles M. Lamb, Equal Housing Opportunity, in 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 148, 148 (Charles S. Bullock III & Charles M. 
Lamb eds., 1984) (describing housing as the civil rights area most resistant to change); 
PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA:  KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 219 
(2003) (arguing that court efforts to integrate housing have “borne little fruit”). 
 14 See Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2006)); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 68–70. 
 15 See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Implementing the Federal Fair Housing Act:  The Adjudication of 
Complaints, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES 143, 168–69 (John Goering ed., 2007) (ar-
guing that HUD’s administrative enforcement scheme should place greater focus on pat-
tern and practice cases); Michael Selmi¸ Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights:  The 
Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1458 (1998) (suggesting that 
treble damages should be awarded in successful housing discrimination cases to create 
stronger incentives for private litigation and deter bad actors).  
 16 The FHA requires the Secretary of HUD and executive departments and agencies to ad-
minister their “programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a 
manner affirmatively to further the policies of [fair housing].”  Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006).  This duty also extends to federal grantees.  Id. at § 5309(b). 
 17 As much as congressional intent can be discerned, support for these purposes is found in 
the text of the Act.  See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 73, 81 
(1968) (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, 
for fair housing throughout the United States.”).  Support is also found in the legislative 
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contention is not that the FHA’s antidiscrimination enforcement re-
gime is unimportant or unsalvageable, but that individualized en-
forcement is too limited a mechanism to achieve fair housing.  Li-
mited, I want to suggest, because of the practical impediments that 
plague fair housing’s enforcement regime.  But also because civil 
rights gains—including the apparent gains in employment—
powerfully depend on the ability of private groups to harness a broad 
range of federal powers.  The “affirmatively to further” provisions of 
the FHA give power to federal agencies to promote antidiscrimina-
tion and integration requirements, and thus extensively shape the 
markets that sustain discrimination as well as segregation. 
This Article’s central aim is to connect AFFH to contemporary 
discussions about the FHA’s efficacy.  An opening, I suggest, is pro-
vided by the recently settled case United States ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Center of Metro New York v. Westchester County18 in which a 
federal court interpreted AFFH to require the county to increase the 
supply of affordable housing in particular towns so as to promote ra-
cial integration, affirmatively market housing to minority communi-
ties, and to remove a range of impediments to providing minorities 
access to housing.  Already being deemed a landmark case by fair 
housing advocates and federal officials,19 the case presents one route 
to unleashing the power of the AFFH—through use of the False 
Claims Act—and has prompted the federal government to initiate ef-
forts to reform its regulations to enforce AFFH more expansively.20  
This case is important, I argue, not only for its specific doctrinal in-
 
history.  See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (documenting Senator Mondale’s state-
ment that the goal of the FHA was to promote “an integrated society, a stable society free 
of the conditions which spawn riots, free of riots themselves”); 114 CONG. REC. 9591 
(1968) (documenting Congressman Ryan’s statement that the FHA would advance “the 
aim of an integrated society”); 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1968) (recording Congressman Cel-
ler’s statment that the Act would help eliminate segregated housing and ghettos).  The 
Supreme Court has recognized the FHA’s goal of racial integration.  See Trafficante v. Me-
tro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting Senator Mondale as supporting the 
claim that Title VIII was intended to replace segregated ghettos with integrated commun-
ities). 
 18 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 19 See Sam Roberts, Westchester Adds Housing to Desegregation Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/nyregion/11settle.html (quoting 
HUD official as saying, “[u]ntil now we tended to lay dormant.  This is historic, because 
we are going to hold people’s feet to the fire”); see also Michael Allen, No Certification, No 
Money:  The Revival of Civil Rights Obligations in HUD Funding Programs, 78 PLAN. COMM’RS 
J. 16, 16 (2010) (describing the Westchester litigation as “ground-breaking”); Westchester 
County Fair Housing Update, OAK PARK REGIONAL HOUSING CENTER (Feb. 27, 2010), 
http://www.oprhc.org/2010/02/westchester-county-fair-housing-case-update (describing 
landmark nature of the settlement). 
 20 See infra text accompanying notes 170, 189. 
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novations but because it centers on deploying federal administrative 
power—including the coercive power of conditioned spending—to 
advance housing choice and integration. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I argues that housing has 
a set of enduring features that challenge the fundamental assump-
tions of antidiscrimination enforcement.  These challenges include 
the difficulty of identifying victims of housing discrimination and the 
decentralized nature of the housing market, which render it hard to 
generate sufficient penalties to alter the behavior of housing market 
players.  Part II connects these practical problems to the design and 
function of fair housing’s federal statutory enforcement regime.  As 
the last of the great civil rights laws of the 1960s—the “last plank” of 
the civil rights movement21—the FHA of 1968 had weak state en-
forcement mechanisms typical of other civil rights laws, but also un-
usually weak private enforcement mechanisms.22  By many accounts, 
even after the significant reforms of the 1988 Amendments, these 
problems have endured.23  Yet, this Part argues that these challenges 
suggest a more fundamental problem with fair housing’s enforce-
ment structure.  The dominant enforcement framework in fair hous-
ing—the FHA’s emphasis on complaint-driven enforcement to com-
bat discrimination in private markets—is necessarily limited given the 
practical challenges in bringing claims, the political challenges in 
building capacity to strengthen the enforcement regime, and the 
profound connection between structural segregation and private 
market discrimination. 
Part III presents the Westchester case as a promising attempt to 
strengthen the other less prominent plank of the FHA’s regulatory 
regime, one that centers not on individualized antidiscrimination en-
forcement, but on harnessing state and local funding recipients to 
promote integration in their programs, and combat barriers to hous-
ing choice.  This Part examines the contours of the decision enforc-
ing the FHA’s “affirmatively to further” provisions using the False 
Claims Act, and situates the case within a broader effort in courts and 
administrative agencies to give meaning to the AFFH provisions. 
Part IV examines the implications of the Westchester case for re-
thinking how the current federal fair housing enforcement regime 
employs both public and private power.  I argue that the strategy to 
 
 21 See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION:  HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2004); see also Lamb, supra note 13, at 148 (de-
scribing housing as the “last major frontier in civil rights”). 
 22 See infra text and accompanying notes 64–66 or 75–85. 
 23 See infra text and accompanying notes 87. 
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enforce AFFH announces a public-private machinery centered not 
just on individual, antidiscrimination enforcement, but on harnessing 
a broad range of federal administrative tools including conditioned 
spending and formal and informal regulation to engage states and 
localities to promote fair housing.  “Harnessing,” I argue, because 
these strategies encompass not just court enforcement, but advocacy 
at the federal, state and local levels.  Finally, I show that emphasis on 
the interconnectedness of the public and private aspects of the fair 
housing problem has power to elevate the visibility of fair housing 
and—by bringing in the state’s role—to reframe contestations that 
often now center on questions of individual attitudes and choice. 
I.  HOUSING’S ENDURING CHALLENGES 
A central theme in contemporary civil rights commentary is the 
disjuncture between the robust equal rights principles announced in 
federal civil rights laws, and the enduring nature of racial inequality.24  
This theme seems especially dominant in fair housing.  Fair housing 
commentators lament the failures of the federal Fair Housing Act of 
196825 to make a greater dent in combating housing discrimination or 
to better promote integrated housing, despite the considerable 
strengthening of the Act in 1988.26  And, commentators argue, the 
FHA has proven to be a less successful mechanism for remedying 
housing discrimination than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
has in addressing employment discrimination.27 
As this Part shows, it is less than clear whether the civil rights gains 
in employment are greater than those in housing.  What seems more 
likely is that fair housing enforcement poses a set of practical and po-
litical challenges for a complaint-driven civil rights enforcement 
model of which Title VII stands as the paradigm.28 
This Part opens by presenting the data on the persistence of dis-
crimination in private housing markets.  This Part then explores a set 
 
 24 See supra note 5. 
 25 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–819, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2006)). 
 26 See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 4, at 455–56 (arguing that despite the supposed “cure” of 
the 1988 amendments to the FHA, something new must be done). 
 27 Id. at 459–60 (noting that “[t]he continuing high degree of noncompliance with FHA 
stands in sharp contrast to” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Lamb, supra note 13, 
at 148 (identifying the same). 
 28 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:  PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN 
THE U.S 3 (2010) (stating that employment discrimination lawsuits reflect a legislative 
choice “to rely upon private litigation in statutory implementation”); id. at 117–19 (detail-
ing legislative history behind the emergence of Title VII’s enforcement scheme). 
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of practical problems in addressing fair housing through individual 
complaints, which more broadly have led commentators to question 
the efficacy of the civil rights enforcement model in tackling housing 
discrimination. 
A. Persistence of Racial Discrimination 
Racial discrimination is a key feature of the American housing 
market with only modest improvements over the decades since the 
enactment of the FHA of 1968.  Measuring racial discrimination in 
housing is complex methodologically, but a leading method involves 
estimating rates of discrimination based on tests pairing white and 
minority individuals seeking to buy or rent homes.29  The most com-
prehensive tests of U.S. metropolitan markets reveal that blacks and 
Latinos seeking housing encounter discrimination nearly a quarter of 
the time.30 
No doubt, even this consistently high rate of racial discrimination 
reflects some progress.  The most comprehensive audit of housing 
discrimination, conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) in 2000, found an approximately 25% decline 
in overall discrimination for blacks and Hispanics between 1988 and 
2000.31  Yet steering—the realtor practice of directing housing seekers 
to particular neighborhoods based on race32—increased over that 
 
 29 See, e.g., JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST:  THE CONTINUING COSTS OF 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 20 (1995) (detailing audit and testing methodology). 
 30 See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., supra note 4, at i–iv (reporting results from a national 
paired-testing Housing Discrimination Study conducted in 2000 by HUD); Discrimination 
in Metropolitan Housing Markets:  National Results from Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 of the 
Housing Discrimination Study (HDS), HUD.GOV (Mar. 30, 2005),  http://www.huduser.org/
publications/hsgfin/hds.html (results of study that measured rates of discrimination in 
housing markets).  As an example, a twelve city testing project carried out in 2003 found 
that, in 20% of the real estate tests, African American or Latino testers were denied ser-
vice by real estate agents or provided limited service; falsely told that a unit was not avail-
able; quoted a higher amount; or directed to housing in neighborhoods with higher mi-
nority concentration.  See NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE (NFHA), DR. KING’S DREAM 
DENIED:  FORTY YEARS OF FAILED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT 28–29 (2008) (discussing audit 
study conducted by the NFHA in 2003). 
 31 See Margery Austin Turner et al., Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America, in FRAGILE 
RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, at 39, 47–49 (providing evidence of discrimination 
declines in rental and sales markets); Julia Reade, Testing for Housing Discrimination:  Find-
ings from a HUD Study of Real Estate Agents, COMMUNITIES. & BANKING, Spring 2003, at 10, 
11 available at http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/c&b/2003/spring/testing.pdf (finding 
significant improvements over an earlier study). 
 32 See George Galster, Racial Steering by Real Estate Agents:  Mechanisms and Motives, 19 REV. OF 
BLACK POL. ECON. 39, 39–40 (1990) (defining racial steering as “behaviors by a real estate 
agent vis-à-vis a client that tend to direct the client toward particular neighborhoods 
and/or away from others”). 
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same time period.33  Moreover, in rental markets—where one-third of 
the nation’s households and half of minority households reside34—
rates of racial discrimination have remained consistently high over 
the past three decades, with blacks experiencing discrimination near-
ly twenty-two percent of the time.35  Indeed, a recent analysis of the 
data led housing expert Robert Schwemm to conclude that rental 
discrimination is “uniquely intractable.”36 
It is this persistent level of racial discrimination in housing that 
leads commentators to compare housing unfavorably with employ-
ment.  The housing market is characterized by higher rates of dis-
crimination than in employment, the testing data appears to suggest, 
and is still largely plagued with issues of explicit bias and exclusion 
reminiscent of the pre-civil rights era.37  That housing discrimination 
is often executed in a friendly manner, “with a handshake and a 
smile,” is particular baffling:  discriminating landlords and real-estate 
agents often direct black testers to places where they can find hous-
ing, kindly offering to help them.38 
In truth, however, the level of housing discrimination and the 
mechanisms that sustain it are difficult to compare to other civil 
rights areas, for the simple (and ironic) reason that discrimination 
may be better documented in housing than in other areas of public 
and private life.  Estimates of the extent of housing discrimination 
come from periodic testing or audit studies.39  Researchers and public 
 
 33 See Casey J. Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes of Black-White Residential Segre-
gation, 26 J. URB. AFF. 379, 393–94 (2004) (noting that between 1989 and 2000, gross inci-
dence of steering based on neighborhood racial composition increased by 10%); George 
Galster & Erin Godfrey, By Words and Deeds:  Racial Steering by Real Estate Agents in the U.S. 
in 2000, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 251, 260 (2005) (noting the difficulty of making intertem-
poral comparisons based on the data, but finding statistically significant increases in se-
gregation steering in black/white tests).  The NFHA study showed that where African 
Americans were actually shown units, the rate of racial steering was about 87%.  See 
NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, supra note 30, at 29. 
 34 See APGAR, supra note 4, at 23 (providing statistics on rental housing). 
 35 The instance of housing discrimination against blacks fell from 26% in 1989 to 22% in 
2000.  See Turner et al., supra note 31, at 39, 47–48. 
 36 Schwemm, supra note 4, at 460. 
 37 See id., at 506–07 (contending that in housing, unlike in employment, “blatant discrimina-
tion remains widespread”). 
 38 See, e.g., Victoria A. Roberts, With a Handshake and a Smile:  The Fight to Eliminate Housing 
Discrimination, 73 MICH. B.J. 276, 276–77 (1994) (noting that “because housing discrimi-
nation is often practiced with a ‘handshake and a smile,’ there is tremendous difficulty in 
proving discrimination”). 
 39 These studies are called “tests” when done directly for enforcement purposes and “audit” 
studies when used for research as well as enforcement.  See YINGER, supra note 29, at 20 
(describing origin and use of fair housing audits).  In an audit, pairs of minorities and 
whites seek housing from real estate agents or landlords, the purpose of which is to de-
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interest groups have relied extensively on testing to measure housing 
discrimination in private markets since the early 1970s,40 and since 
1977 HUD has conducted periodic, comprehensive audits assessing 
discrimination in various U.S. housing markets.41  By contrast wide-
scale testing is nonexistent in employment, consumer markets or 
other areas.42  Indeed, when in recent years social scientists began 
doing small paired testing initiatives in employment at the hiring 
stage, they found marked and consistent levels of racial discrimina-
tion.43 
 
termine levels of discrimination against minorities.  See id.  Audit teammates are made to 
seem comparable on all characteristics except minority status.  See id. at 23–25.  Team-
mates are matched on the characteristics of sex, age, and appearance; assigned similar 
economic and family characteristics (with a slightly higher income assigned to the minor-
ity homeseeker); trained to behave comparably; and, visits are timed close together.  See 
id. at 23–25 (describing the four tools of audit design, “matching, assignment, training, 
and timing”). 
 40 Researchers conducted small-scale audits in California in 1955 and 1971 and a larger au-
dit study in Detroit from 1974 to 1975.  See id. at 20–21.  By the 1970s, fair housing testing 
was a central tool in the enforcement arsenal of fair housing groups.  See id. (describing 
the development of fair housing auditing process). 
 41 HUD gave its imprimatur to the audit strategy in 1977, hiring researchers to conduct a 
comprehensive series of tests known as the Housing Market Practices Survey (HMPS).  See 
id. at 20.  The 1977 HMPS involved more than three thousand audits in forty metropoli-
tan areas to determine levels of discrimination against blacks, in sales and rental markets, 
as well as a small pilot test of discrimination against Latinos in Dallas.  Id.  Researchers 
under contract from HUD uncovered substantial discrimination against blacks.  Id.  A 
subsequent study in Dallas found high-levels of discrimination against Latinos, particular-
ly those with dark skin.  Id.  In 1989, HUD began its second major national study, includ-
ing both blacks and Latinos.  See Turner et al., supra note 31, at 40.  From 2000 to 2003, 
HUD conducted its most recent study.  Id. 
 42 See Devah Pager, Is Racial Discrimination A Thing of the Past?, AAPSS.ORG (Jan. 11, 2007), 
http://aapss.org/index.cfm?catID=11 (“Unlike the arena of housing discrimination, in 
which dozens of federally sponsored testing studies have taken place, the use of the audit 
methodology for both research and litigation in the area of employment discrimination 
has thus far remained negligible.”).  Ian Ayres has conducted compelling tests in a variety 
of consumer markets.  See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?  UNCONVENTIONAL 
EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 397 (2001) (“Government should more 
systemically test for disparate treatment across a wide variety of markets.”). 
 43 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 3 (MIT Dep’t of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003) (finding that candidates with white identified 
names were more than 50% likely to get a positive response from an employer than simi-
larly qualified employers with “black” names); Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for 
Studies of Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 104, 114 (2007), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~pager/annals_pager.pdf (surveying audit studies and con-
cluding that “race has large effects on employment opportunities, with a black job seeker 
anywhere between 50 and 500 percent less likely to be considered by employers as an 
equally qualified white job applicant”); Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Discrimination in 
Low-Wage Labor Markets:  Evidence From an Experimental Audit Study in New York City 2 (2005) 
(submission to the Population Association of America Annual Meetings), available at 
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Still, while the testing data does little to prove that housing is 
worse than other areas, it does reveal the extent and persistence of 
housing discrimination.  Data on racial segregation in housing—an 
indirect measure of housing discrimination44—similarly reveals only 
modest declines in segregation.45  Data at the neighborhood level re-
veals an increase in integrated neighborhoods, though most of that 
increase is the result of the sharing of neighborhoods by whites, His-
panic and nonblack minorities.46  The empirical data on segregation 
reveals the enduring nature of black-white separation in housing; 
blacks remain highly segregated from whites and more segregated 
than other groups.47  It also suggests the singularity of housing in the 
degree of separation, and the role this separation plays in driving se-
gregation in other sectors such as in education.48 
 
http://paa2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=50874 (finding whites con-
sistently favored over blacks and Latinos in low-wage job markets). 
 44 Studies have shown that housing discrimination perpetuates residential segregation.  See, 
e.g., George Galster, More Than Skin Deep:  The Effect of Discrimination on the Extent and Pat-
tern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND 
FEDERAL POLICY 119, 133 (John M. Goering ed., 1986) (finding that housing discrimina-
tion was “likely responsible for a significant portion of the extent and pattern of racial se-
gregation observed in metropolitan areas where it was present”). 
 45 This study involves a spatial measure of segregation known as dissimilarity and isolation, 
which measures “the percentage of a group’s population that would have to change resi-
dence for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as the metro-
politan area overall.”  John Iceland, Racial and Ethnic Segregation and the Role of Socioeconom-
ic Status, 1980–2000, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, at 107, 109. 
 46 See Ingrid Gould Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become During the 1990s?, in FRAGILE RIGHTS 
WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, at 123, 131. 
 47 See Iceland, supra note 45, at 117. 
 48 Many researchers understand residential segregation as the linchpin for understanding a 
range of contemporary racial disparities, including the problem of persistent poverty 
which is particularly acute for African Americans (the group most likely to live in neigh-
borhoods of high-poverty concentration).  Much research suggests that neighborhoods of 
concentrated poverty can hamper social mobility and economic advancement, com-
pounding the effects of individual poverty status.  Neighborhoods of intense racial segre-
gation and poverty concentration tend to have lower quality schools and are isolated from 
valuable employment opportunities as well as other resources that facilitate mobility.  See 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 149–53 (1993) (discussing the connection between residen-
tial segregation and socioeconomic status); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK 
DISAPPEARS:  THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 19–24 (1996) (considering the prob-
lems of “poor, segregated neighborhoods in which a substantial majority of the individual 
adults are either unemployed or have dropped out of the labor force altogether”); Erica 
Frankenberg, The Impact of School Segregation on Residential Housing Patterns:  Mobile, Ala-
bama, and Charlotte, North Carolina, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION:  MUST THE SOUTH TURN 
BACK? 164, 164 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005) (noting that “segregated 
neighborhoods often create segregated schools,” while ultimately illustrating the interac-
tive effect between school and neighborhood segregation). 
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B. The Challenges of Individual Enforcement 
Remedying what the literature describes as persistent and wide-
spread housing discrimination poses challenges to the canonical civil 
rights enforcement regime, which depends largely on individuals to 
bring complaints, and courts—and in the case of housing, adminis-
trative agencies—to award damages and injunctive relief against dis-
criminatory actors.49  The FHA outlaws a range of discriminatory 
practices including refusals to rent, sell and/or otherwise make a unit 
unavailable,50 and allows individuals to bring litigation in court and 
seek a broad range of remedies.51  As a result of the 1988 Amend-
ments in particular, the FHA also provides expedited administrative 
complaint procedures, allowing aggrieved persons to file complaints 
with HUD, and granting HUD authority to award damages, injunctive 
relief and civil penalties in meritorious cases.52 
The basic premise of the regime is that through threat of en-
forcement and penalties, property owners and real estate agents will 
lessen discriminatory behavior.53  While it may be too much to say that 
 
 49 See Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants:  Evidence From the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2009) (discussing litigation enforcement 
models under Title VII); Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
782, 783–84 (2011) (discussing congressionally created incentives to sue as a mechanism 
for furthering statutory goals).  
 50 The FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, 
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, 
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).  The Act also bans discrimination in the terms, con-
ditions or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling (§ 3604(c), (f)(2)), and a range of 
discriminatory practices including discriminatory provision of services and facilities 
(§ 3604(b)), discriminatory advertising (§ 3604(d)), blockbusting (§ 3604(e)), and dis-
criminatory financing (§ 3605). 
 51 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (authorizing aggrieved persons to bring suits in federal or 
state court without filing an administrative complaint). 
 52 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2006) (authorizing aggrieved persons to file a complaint with 
HUD).  The Act requires HUD to refer complaints to state or local agencies with “sub-
stantially equivalent” fair housing laws.  Id.  The administrative procedure allows ag-
grieved persons to seek an administrative hearing with HUD, and allows either the ag-
grieved person or the defendant to elect instead federal court in which case the 
Department of Justice represents the complainant.  Id. at § 3612.  The Act also provides a 
third enforcement mechanism which authorizes the Attorney General to bring a federal 
suit in “pattern or practice” cases or where a complaint raises an issue of “general public 
importance.”  Id. at § 3614. 
 53 This was the essential premise of the 1988 Amendments detailed in Part III.  See H.R. REP. 
NO. 100-711, at 16 (1958), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2177 (declaring that the 
1968 Act lacked an effective enforcement mechanism); see also Schill, supra note 15, at 
168–69 (“The Fair Housing Amendments Act was adopted by Congress in 1988 primarily 
to provide an effective and efficient way for people who felt that they had been unlawfully 
discriminated against to vindicate their rights.”).  That greater litigation will induce com-
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housing discrimination is impervious to these enforcement attempts, 
systemic difficulties attend this enforcement approach. 
First is the pervasive disconnect between the extent of housing 
discrimination as reported by audit studies and the number of hous-
ing discrimination complaints.54  By all estimates, only a small number 
of potential victims of housing discrimination make use of the en-
forcement system.  Potential complainants might not know they have 
been victims of discrimination.55  More troublingly, even those who 
believe they have been victimized by discrimination are unlikely to 
take legal or administrative action because they fear the time and 
money needed to resolve claims, and lack faith that the resolution 
will prove favorable.56  A related explanation may be that, particularly 
in the rental market, individuals have little investment in a specific 
choice of housing:  if they eventually find some housing, they will 
have little incentive to complain.  With regard both to the FHA’s ad-
ministrative enforcement system and private court actions, few hous-
ing cases are brought and few are successful relative to the high levels 
of market discrimination.57 
 
pliance often is a key assumption in congressional choices to encourage greater private 
litigation.  See Lemos, supra note 49, at 794–95 (discussing this assumption, but arguing 
that the premises that underlie it are questionable). 
 54 See Margery Austin Turner & Carla Herbig, Closing Doors on Americans’ Housing Choices, 
URBAN INSTITUTE (Sept. 18, 2005), available at www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900853 (not-
ing that housing discrimination is often “so subtle that victims don’t even recognize it”); 
John Goering, An Overview of Key Issues in the Field of Fair Housing Research, in FRAGILE 
RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, 19, 32–33 (discussing the gap between the frequen-
cy of housing discrimination and complaints about it). 
 55 See Goering, supra note 54, at 28 (noting the varying degrees of knowledge Americans 
have about housing discrimination prohibitions). 
 56 This is based on housing surveys of those who have been victimized by housing discrimi-
nation.  See, e.g., MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL & MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, HOW MUCH DO WE 
KNOW?  PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE NATION’S FAIR HOUSING LAWS (2002) at 27–28, availa-
ble at http://www.huduser.org/publications/fairhsg/hmwk.html (finding that 83% of 
those surveyed said they would “do nothing about” the discrimination, while only 16% 
said they would take action); Goering, supra note 54, at 33 (reporting that only 5% of 
people who experienced housing discrimination indicated they would file a complaint 
with an agency or attorney).  This data comes from two national cross-sectional surveys, 
sponsored by HUD in 2001 and 2005 to discover the fair housing attitudes of the Ameri-
can public.  For the most part individuals knew where to turn for help, but were likely de-
terred by often erroneous conceptions about the costs of filing a legal or administrative 
complaint and the perceived length of time for resolving such complaints.  Id. 
 57 See Schill, supra note 15, at 169 (finding that between 1989 and 2003 very few cases filed 
with HUD received favorable findings on their merits for plaintiff, and that for cases set-
tled by HUD, and adjudicated either by HUD’s Administrative Law Judges or by the DOJ, 
damages were low relative to private litigation).  Note that this disconnect between the 
prevalence of discrimination and the rate of filing exists in employment as well, but the 
overall high levels of Title VII litigation make claims of underenforcement less resonant.  
Compare Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation:  Title VII, Print Media 
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Second, the current system struggles to generate remedies suffi-
cient to force antidiscrimination reform by the real estate industry.  
The fragmented nature of the real estate market, with its multitude of 
real estate agents, individual homeowners, and small property man-
agers,58 means that thwarting discrimination requires a significant 
threat of complaints and substantial penalties for discrimination.59  
But the fair housing enforcement system generates neither.60  As 
noted above, complaints are low, and, as several studies reveal, dam-
ages in housing cases are on average too inconsistent and generally 
too low to alter the behavior of potential discriminators.61 
In short, if the central assumption of a federal antidiscrimination 
enforcement regime is that redressing complaints will remedy market 
discrimination, this assumption is challenged by the structure of 
housing markets, and the difficulties in incentivizing individuals to 
bring complaints. 
 
and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 241 (2004) 
(noting that one third of those who reported unfair treatment in employment took no 
action, and “only 3% reported suing their employer”), with Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart 
J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:  From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 114–16 (2009) (showing that 23,722 employment discrimination 
cases were terminated in federal court in 1998 and that 70% of those cases raised Title 
VII claims). 
 58 See, e.g., WILLIAM APGAR & SHEKAR NARASIMHAN, ENHANCING ACCESS TO CAPITAL FOR 
SMALL UNSUBSIDIZED MULTIFAMILY RENTAL PROPERTIES 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/revisiting_rental_symposium/papers/
rr07-8_apgar.pdf (noting that majority of unsubsidized rental housing consists of struc-
tures with under fifty units); AGPAR, supra note 4, at 26 (noting that “[f]or many property 
owners, operating rental housing is a part time business”).  Some of the industry frag-
mentation may be changing, particularly with regard to rental housing.  Larger apart-
ment management companies form an increasing share of the rental market.  See id. at 22 
(“[N]early 2.7 million new multifamily rental units were built between 1992 and 2001.”).  
It remains to be seen how these changes will affect private market discrimination.  Larger 
builders often have formalized mechanisms for advertising vacancies and receiving appli-
cations which might leave less discretion to individual property managers to discriminate 
on the basis of race, ethnicity or other factors.  In addition, as the share of large property 
owners increases, the rental market industry may be more sensitive to damage remedies 
in litigation. 
 59 See Schill, supra note 15, at 169 (“If penalties are low, then enforcement efforts must be 
intensive so that most lawbreakers will be identified and punished.  Alternatively, if inten-
sive identification and prosecution of violators of the law is infeasible, then deterrence 
would require high penalties for those relatively few who are caught.”). 
 60 See id. (noting that “very few meritorious cases are actually brought (when measured 
against baseline estimates of the amount of discrimination in the housing market) and 
the average penalty is exceedingly low”). 
 61 See id.  (noting that damages are modest in settled cases, as well as cases adjudicated by 
HUD ALJs and in federal court). 
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II.  THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEMENT 
Reformers have long perceived these problems in fair housing.62  
The key question is why the problems identified in Part I continue to 
exist despite the considerable strengthening of the enforcement re-
gime in 1988.  On one level this too is not difficult to answer:  as a 
matter of both design and practical function neither the Act’s private 
enforcement apparatus nor its administrative enforcement mechan-
isms are sufficiently robust or efficacious.  The solution then should 
be to strengthen the capacity of the enforcement apparatus by in-
creasing damages and penalties, for instance, or deploying more test-
ing.  Yet, as I argue below, the persistent problems in the enforce-
ment regime push us to ask whether the individualized 
antidiscrimination enforcement regime of fair housing will ever be 
sufficient.  First, because the dominant enforcement conception de-
pends heavily on requiring private individuals to self-identify as vic-
tims of discrimination and bring complaints.63  Second—and more 
fundamentally—because framing the problem of housing merely in 
terms of discrimination is too narrow.  This framing leaves out the 
state as a market player and participant in creating the conditions of 
segregation which powerfully interact with private discrimination.  In 
addition, in an area without large institutional players, insufficiently 
heeding to state actors misses opportunities to engage a set of enti-
ties—federal, state, and local government actors—that have power to 
shape housing patterns and promote fair housing. 
This Part first explores the disjuncture between the formal 
strength of the regime and the reality of its weakness.  It then argues 
for moving beyond an individualized, antidiscrimination conception 
of the problem to better promote both housing choice and integra-
tion. 
A. A Question of Design 
On a formal level, the FHA’s enforcement regime is quite 
strong—its individual enforcement remedies are comparable to em-
ployment in allowing compensatory and punitive damages and in-
junctive relief.  The FHA also has an administrative enforcement re-
 
 62 See, e.g., YINGER, supra note 29, 188–90 (noting weaknesses in the initial FHA). 
 63 Not all aspects of the FHA’s enforcement system require individuals to file complaints.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (2006) (allowing HUD to initiate complaints).  But as a practical 
matter, individual complaints remain the prime mechanism for enforcement. 
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gime that is stronger than in employment, one specifically intended 
to surmount the barriers in bringing complaints. 
This current framework represents an evolution in the FHA.  At its 
inception, the FHA was quite weak, even as compared to other civil 
rights statutes.  When Congress, in the wake of uprisings following 
the assassination of Martin Luther King, enacted the FHA of 1968,64 it 
was no secret that the Act’s enforcement measures were lacking.65  
The Act instantiated the first federal prohibition against housing dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion and national origin, 
outlawing such discrimination in sales, rentals and a variety of other 
real estate practices.66  Though the Act announced the ambitious goal 
of achieving “fair housing throughout the United States”67 both the 
public and the private enforcement mechanisms were weak. 
This thin remedial structure was by design.  Weak public enforce-
ment was the central compromise that permitted passage of civil 
rights legislation in the 1960s.  In the 1950s and 1960s, as Congress 
debated civil rights legislation, the civil rights leadership initially 
sought to create government agencies with broad authority to en-
force civil rights laws.68  Early versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 
proposed a single agency that would enforce civil rights laws by con-
ducting litigation in education, employment and public accommoda-
tions, but Congress declined to adopt such an approach.  When Con-
gress considered the bill that would become Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, civil rights advocates again promoted an employ-
ment/labor agency with broad authority to enforce employment dis-
crimination laws, not primarily through court litigation but through 
 
 64 As one commentator has noted, after the uprisings following the death of Martin Luther 
King, “moods” in Washington—where many congressional members had resisted the 
FHA—“changed overnight.”  See GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE 85 
(1988).  The political pressures were such that the House and Senate did not conference 
the bill.  Id.  President Johnson signed it on April 9, 1968, just five days after Martin Luth-
er King’s death.  Id. 
 65 See YINGER, supra note 29, at 189 (describing compromises necessary for passing the 
FHA). 
 66 See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804–06, 82 Stat. 73, 83–84 (1968). 
 67 Id. § 801, 82 Stat. at 81. 
 68 The political science literature has well documented the general weakness of the “Ameri-
can state’s capacity to protect civil rights.”  Robert C. Lieberman, Weak State, Strong Policy:  
Paradoxes of Race Policy in the United States, Great Britain, and France, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
138, 138 (2002).  While civil rights advocates initially favored civil rights legislation that 
granted the executive a strong role in enforcement, such attempts were consistently de-
feated by Southerners and opponents of civil rights.  See id. at 141, 143 (“The congres-
sional compromise over antidiscrimination policy, then, was a product of both the institu-
tional structure of American politics and policymaking and the distinctive pattern of 
agreement and controversy surrounding civil rights in the 1960s.”). 
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the use of federal administrative power.  Key congressional players re-
sisted these proposals, claiming that enlarged federal agencies would 
encroach on state authority.69  In the end, the 1964 Act was passed on-
ly after a series of legislative compromises that would weaken agency 
enforcement power.70  The compromise that would eventually emerge 
in Title VII allowed a private enforcement scheme.71 
The same pattern of compromise is evident with regard to public 
enforcement in Title VIII.  The original versions of the bill that would 
become the FHA of 1968 empowered the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) to investigate discriminatory com-
plaints, hold evidentiary hearings and issue enforcement orders.  Af-
ter several filibusters, Congress eventually stripped HUD of its power 
to hold hearings or to seek enforcement, allowing it only powers to 
conciliate claims it found meritorious.72  The FHA allowed HUD to 
refer cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for litigation, but only 
pattern or practice cases, or where the discrimination raised an issue 
of “general public importance.”73  The DOJ’s power was limited to re-
questing injunctive relief, and thus it was not allowed to seek com-
pensatory or punitive damages.74 
Significantly, the private enforcement scheme in housing was also 
weak by design, arguably weaker than in Title VII.75  Aggrieved indi-
viduals could file FHA claims in state or federal court, but Title VII 
subjected these suits to a short, 180-day statute of limitations.76  While 
allowing actual damages, courts were given very limited power to 
 
 69 See FARHANG, supra note 28, at 106–09, 113–14 (describing the weakening of the EEOC’s 
enforcement powers). 
 70 See Lieberman, supra note 68, at 141–43 (discussing congressional compromises that li-
mited EEOC enforcement power). 
 71 See FARHANG, supra note 28, 112–14 (explaining the emergence of private enforcement as 
a compromise and the weakening of EEOC’s power); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ERA:  ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 147–49 
(1990) (describing compromises that famously broke the record filibuster of the 1964 
legislation). 
 72 The FHA required HUD to investigate, pursue, or dismiss complaints of housing discrim-
ination within thirty days of filing.  If HUD found a complaint meritorious, it had no 
power to bring its own suits; it could only conduct a “conference, conciliation, and persu-
asion.”  Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 73, 85 (1968).  Republi-
can Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, a key Republican gatekeeper, was chief in insisting 
on restrictive enforcement to gain his support.  See METCALF, supra note 64, at 18. 
 73 See § 813(a), 82 Stat. 73, 88 (1968). 
 74 See id. 
 75 While Title VII did not initially permit recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, it 
did allow attorney’s fees and the appointment of counsel.  See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259–62. 
 76 See § 812(a), 82 Stat. 73, 88 (1968). 
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award costs, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages, thus creating dis-
incentives for private attorneys to bring suit.77 
That this weak enforcement apparatus would produce limited fair 
housing enforcement cannot be surprising.  Indeed, strengthening 
the FHA’s enforcement capacity became the central occupation of 
fair housing reformers over the next two decades,78 culminating even-
tually in the amendments in 1988.79  These amendments lengthened 
the statute of limitations for private complaints, and allowed attor-
ney’s fees and punitive damages in private suits.80  The public en-
forcement capacity that would emerge through these amendments is 
now stronger than that of the EEOC.  Significantly, the legislative 
changes of 1988 sought to lower the barriers of formal court litiga-
tion, and create a system that surmounted the problem that victims of 
discrimination are often unlikely to complain.  The amendments 
created a new administrative enforcement system to lower the burden 
and costs for victims of discrimination, by constructing a system that 
would allow victims to pursue claims before administrative law 
judges.81 
B. Functional Reality 
One of the chief disappointments in fair housing is that the en-
hanced public enforcement capacity that was the chief goal of the 
1988 Act has not produced greater results.  The administrative com-
plaint system has historically been plagued by staffing problems and 
delays82 remains vastly underutilized compared to reported inci-
 
 77 See id. § 812(c), 82 Stat. at 88 (capping punitive damages initially at $1000); 114 CONG. 
REC. 5514–15 (1968) (documenting statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd proposing to 
limit the awarding of attorney’s fees where the plaintiff is financially able to assume 
them).  Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, who was opposed to the FHA, submitted 
the amendment and it passed on a voice veto with little discussion.  See id.  It is not clear 
that the Act’s chief sponsors fully understood the implications of this change.  See 
METCALF, supra note 64, at 5 (noting that attorney’s fees limitations reduced the number 
of private attorneys willing to take cases). 
 78 See METCALF, supra note 64, at 22 (detailing advocacy and legislative efforts, beginning in 
the mid-1970s, to strengthen the Act). 
 79 See Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2006)). 
 80 The FHAA lengthened the statute of limitations to two years for private suits and to one 
year for complaints to HUD.  See id. § 8, 102 Stat. at 1625, 1633 (1988). 
 81 See id. § 8, 102 Stat. at 1629–33.  See also YINGER, supra note 29, at 190, 192. 
 82 See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS OF 1988:  THE ENFORCEMENT 
PROCESS (1994) (analyzing the first four years of HUD enforcement and finding that 
HUD procedures were deficient); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAIR HOUSING:  
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE HUD’S OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT 
PROCESS 46–49 (2004) (finding a significant increase in the number of investigations 
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dences of discrimination, and penalties awarded by HUD’s Adminis-
trative Law Judges (ALJ) remain low compared to those awarded in 
private lawsuits.83  Cases filed in court by HUD and by the DOJ in-
creased after the 1988 Act, but by some analyses, this has made little 
dent in the rates of discrimination.84 
These data rightly lead to questioning the design and implemen-
tation of the FHA’s current public enforcement scheme.  Govern-
ment enforcement, some have suggested, should be directed to more 
strategic resolution of cases, such as taking pattern and practice cases 
rather than relying on complaint-driven litigation.85  Congress should 
transfer authority for fair housing enforcement outside of HUD to a 
separate agency dedicated to fair housing enforcement.86  Even then 
some might argue that administrative enforcement may never prove 
equal to the task:  government enforcement is by its nature inefficient 
and bureaucratic, and political incentives reward a cautious approach 
to enforcement, with resolution of noncontroversial cases rather than 
high-profile ones.87 
What is striking, however, is that the private system for enforcing 
the Act has been persistently weak.  In the American civil rights regu-
latory system, as both a matter of legislative design and practical op-
eration, private litigation often compensates for weak state power.88  
 
completed by HUD in 2001, but noting that HUD remain plagued with staffing problems, 
and that many of HUD staff lacked the necessary skills to conduct investigations). 
 83 See Schill, supra note 15, at 169–71 (showing low rates of usage of the HUD ALJ process). 
 84 See Schwemm, supra note 4, at 467, 471–72 (noting the increase in cases and little differ-
ence in rental discrimination). 
 85 See, e.g., Schill supra note 15, at 169 (suggesting that HUD and the DOJ “might better turn 
their attention to systemic investigations and prosecutions of discrimination in the hous-
ing market”). 
 86 See, e.g., John Goering, The Effectiveness of Fair Housing Programs and Policy Options, in 
FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, at 253, 271 (arguing that a “new indepen-
dent commission focused on fair housing rights and remedies” would “end HUD’s com-
plicated, conflicted role as housing provider, mortgage guarantor, and legal arbiter of 
what housing treatment is fair and equal”). 
 87 See Selmi, supra note 15, at 1438–41, 1451 (discussing the reasons why government is 
largely incapable of robust civil rights enforcement).  Myriam E. Gilles has in a different 
context argued that centralized administrative enforcement schemes insufficiently har-
ness the expertise, energy and resources of private citizens.  See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinvent-
ing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1387 (2000). 
 88 See FARHANG, supra note 28, at 214 (concluding that “[p]rivate enforcement regimes are a 
critically important instrument that American state actors use to achieve their objectives 
in the process of policy implementation”); Caroline R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, 
The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:  The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private At-
torney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2007) (observing that civil rights enforcement 
relies heavily on private suits, since federal enforcement agencies have limited resources); 
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Yet in housing, case studies suggest that this has not been the story.  
In the years before the 1988 amendments to the FHA there was little 
FHA private litigation and drastically less compared to Title VII.89  By 
some accounts despite these amendments,the private infrastructure 
for enforcement of fair housing remains weak.90  Federal resources 
for housing enforcement declined through much of the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and are historically insufficient to meet the enforce-
ment need.91  National civil rights groups like the NAACP Legal De-
fense Educational Fund (LDF), which pioneered litigation to address 
employment discrimination and pursue racial integration in educa-
tion, were extensively involved in pre-FHA litigation, but have not 
been major players in enforcing the FHA.  And private fair housing 
groups that conduct fair housing litigation and testing at the state 
and local levels are historically underfunded and unstable.92 
The reasons for the weakness of the private bar are complex.  The 
incentives for bringing actions may remain too low:  additional dam-
age and penalty enhancements would then seem necessary to invigo-
rate fair housing enforcement.93  And initial regulatory compromises 
made in the FHA may continue to have consequences for the power 
of private fair housing groups to bring discrimination claims and 
shape housing policy.94  On this point, political scientist Mara Sidney 
has argued that fair housing policy—both as it was shaped by national 
policy and implemented by fair housing groups—encourages low-
profile work on individual cases, divorced from questions of afforda-
 
Lemos, supra note 49, at 788 (noting that private enforcement can “supplement public ef-
forts, picking up the slack where agency resources run out”). 
 89 See SCHWEMM, supra note 2, at 1–2 (stating that in the years before the 1988 Amendments, 
fair housing failed to “develop into a major area of law like employment discrimination 
and school desegregation”); Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing 
Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 381 (1988) (comparing private FHA litigation in the 
twenty year period between 1968 and 1988 with Title VII litigation).  
 90 See Mara S. Sidney, National Fair Housing Policy and Its (Perverse) Effects on Local Advocacy, in 
FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, at 205–07 (discussing changes in the FHA, 
and noting that the fair housing infrastructure nevertheless remains weak at the state lev-
el). 
 91 Stephen L. Ross & George C. Galster, Fair Housing Enforcement and Changes in Discrimina-
tion between 1989 and 2000, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 15, at 177, 195–
96 (noting that “the general effectiveness of fair housing agencies . . . will be streng-
thened if they receive a more stable base of funding”). 
 92 See Sidney, supra note 90, at 206 (noting that HUD can change its funding allocations on 
a yearly basis). 
 93 See Selmi, supra note 15, at 1454 (suggesting that awarding treble damages akin to those 
in antitrust cases would increase the attractiveness of civil rights cases). 
 94 See Sidney, supra note 90, at 203 (arguing that “fair housing policies, rooted in their fram-
ing and funding statutes, have produced organizations that are predictably unstable 
[and] fragmented”). 
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ble housing, or promoting racial integration through affirmative 
measures.95 
More broadly, fair housing may be less salient an issue and more 
political contested.  Commentators have chronicled African-
American “fatigue” with the FHA’s integrationist goals, casting it as a 
function of integration gains in other areas (schools, workplace) that 
leave especially middle-class blacks looking for an escape from deal-
ing with race in society.96  Housing is often framed within a rhetoric 
of individual choice:  the idea of one’s housing as a private, intimate 
space, and, for minorities facing a discriminatory world, a place of re-
fuge remains a powerful norm.97  While hard to empirically docu-
ment, this political texture may influence the demand structure for 
strengthening housing’s enforcement regime. 
To be sure, some empirical assessments provide more reason for 
optimism about private enforcement capacity.  Several researchers 
have noted significant declines in discrimination in particular juris-
dictions following both the 1988 Act and HUD-created programs that 
provided funding to fair housing groups for a range of enforcement 
activities.98  These data suggest that more public and private funding 
for enforcement activities would increase deterrence, and provide an 
effective route to combating discrimination.  Additional case studies 
 
 95 See id. at 210–11 (arguing that policy choices can emphasize individual case processing to 
the detriment of either broader or locally driven visions of fair housing). 
 96 See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 21, at 9 (describing “integration exhaustion”—African Ameri-
can reluctance to move into neighborhoods “without a significant black presence”); Mi-
chelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 269–71 (2006) (discussing inte-
grationist and nationalists tensions in black politics).  Empirical data, however, belie these 
accounts, showing support for integration among African Americans.  See Camille Zu-
brinsky Charles, Can We Live Together?  Racial Preferences and Neighborhood Outcomes, in THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY, RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 45, 
72–73 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (finding increased preferences for integrated 
living among all racial and ethnic groups). 
 97 See CASHIN, supra note 21, at 18–19 (describing the view of some blacks that “being an 
integration pioneer can be wearing on the soul [and] that being in a warm welcoming 
community that understands you implicitly is inherently attractive and achievable in a way 
that the fantasy of residential integration is not”); SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 209 (discuss-
ing contribution of “benign” clustering in ethnic enclaves as a contributing factor to ra-
cial isolation).  As I discuss below, however, these personal preferences are not fixed, but 
powerfully shaped by existing conditions of segregation.  See infra note 103 and accompa-
nying text. 
 98 See Ross & Galster, supra note 91, at 178–79 (describing changes in fair housing law and 
policy since 1987); id. at 195 (finding a correlation between higher amounts of monetary 
awards secured during the 1990s and declines in discrimination against black home seek-
ers); see also id. (conceding no absolute certainty of causation, but stating that “[t]he 
magnitude of our estimates suggests that enforcement effectiveness contributed substan-
tially to the decline in discrimination”). 
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would give us a richer sense of the limitations and potential of the 
private housing bar, including the role that private lawyers not con-
nected with traditional fair housing groups have begun to play over 
the last two decades. 
Even so, the persistent problems within the system, and the politi-
cal barriers to generating more extensive change should lead us to 
examine the limitations of the antidiscrimination frame in achieving 
the FHA’s twin goals of nondiscrimination and integration. 
C. Shifting the Enforcement Frame 
What I suggest in this section is that individualized, complaint-
driven enforcement not only has the practical challenges docu-
mented in Part I, but is also too narrow a conception of the fair hous-
ing problem given the deep connection between public actors and 
private markets, and the role of both in shaping individual choice. 
For one, a discrimination regime focused on private actors in the 
real estate industry leaves out the state as a market player in generat-
ing segregation, and as a potential institutional lever in addressing 
problems of discrimination and segregation.  While the causes of pri-
vate market discrimination are multiple and often difficult to untan-
gle, much data reveals a deep connection between private markets 
and public action.  Private market discrimination is explained by a 
range of factors including the personal prejudices and bias of partici-
pants in the real estate industry, the prejudices and preferences of 
white customers, and the economic incentives to industry players that 
flow from honoring these prejudices.99  Yet, studies also suggest that 
discrimination in housing remains pervasive not simply because of 
prejudice and attitudes, but because racial segregation provides the 
conditions that sustain those prejudices.  For instance, whites avoid 
neighborhoods with high black populations because of negative con-
ceptions of such neighborhoods, including fear of crime associated 
 
 99 See George C. Galster, The Ecology of Racial Discrimination in Housing:  An Exploratory Model, 
23 URB. AFF. Q. 84, 87 (1987) (theorizing that housing market agents “are motivated fun-
damentally by their personal prejudice[s] against minority households”); Jan Ondrich et 
al., Do Landlords Discriminate?  The Incidence and Causes of Racial Discrimination in Rental 
Housing Markets, 8 J. HOUS. ECON. 185, 185 (1999) (forwarding that landlords discrimi-
nate in response to both their personal prejudices and prejudices of white clients); John 
Yinger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits:  Caught in the Act, 76 AM. 
ECON. REV. 881, 881 (1986) (finding that housing agents “cater to the racial prejudice” of 
white customers); John Yinger, Prejudice and Discrimination in the Urban Housing Market, in 
CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 430, 430 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim 
eds., 1979) (discussing price discrimination and exclusion against blacks). 
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with black neighborhoods,100 and negative perceptions of the quality 
of high-minority schools.101  Segregation creates the opportunity for 
real-estate agents to discriminate, and in particular allows steering.102  
Segregation in housing is also “race-making” in a range of complex 
ways; it sustains a cycle of distance that can reinforce prejudice and 
negative attitudes that fuel discriminatory behavior.103 
This segregation in turn is maintained not only by private market 
discrimination,104 but also by the discriminatory actions of federal, 
state and local governments.  Federal loan practices, public housing 
programs, and federally-funded urban renewal programs played a 
large and well-documented role in producing current patterns of se-
gregation.105  And, even as federal funds for subsidized housing pro-
grams have diminished in more recent years, a range of federally 
funded programs—including federal public housing programs, 
community development block grant programs, the federal Low-
 
100 See Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime?  The Role of Racial Stereo-
types in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717, 749 (2001) (finding a posi-
tive association between the percentage of young black men in a neighborhood and per-
ceptions of the neighborhood crime level even after controlling for crime rates and other 
neighborhood characteristics); see also William H. Frey & Dowell Myers, Neighborhood Based 
Segregation in Single-Race and Multi-Race America:  A Census 2000 Study of Cities and Metropoli-
tan Areas 5 (Fannie Mae Found., Working Paper, 2002), available at 
http://www.censusscope.org/FreyWPFinal.pdf (noting that the multiple causes of hous-
ing segregation include “disparate economic resources across groups, preferences to re-
side with same-group neighbors, community zoning laws that discourage economic inte-
gration, and the long history of discriminatory practices on the part of lending 
institutions, realtors, insurers and rental agents”). 
101 See Frankenberg, supra note 48, at 164 (“[R]acial composition, percentage of poor stu-
dents, and academic quality—all send important signals to parents and home owners.”); 
Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools:  School Choice and the Social Construc-
tion of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177, 180–81 (2002) (finding, based on a study 
of school choice among high status parents, that a school’s racial composition serves as a 
proxy for school quality); Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and Education:  
The Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION:  THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 125, 128 (James H. 
Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008) (noting a connection between school segregation 
and racial steering). 
102 See Galster and Godfrey, supra note 33, at 253, 260 (defining “segregation steering” and 
providing evidence from black/white tests that show increases in such steering between 
1989 and 2000). 
103 See David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-making Situation:  The Effects of Residential Se-
gregation on Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC’Y INQUIRY 407, 413 (1994) 
(reviewing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48) (arguing that “[t]oday, racially segregated 
neighborhoods are the most important social situations maintaining racial identities and 
racial prejudices”); see also Quillian & Pager, supra note 100, at 720–23, 748–49 (noting 
white avoidance of African-American neighbors because of associations between African 
Americans and crime). 
104 See supra note 44. 
105 See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 48, at 41–57 (documenting federal government 
contribution to contemporary segregation). 
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Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC), and federally-funded 
voucher programs—remain powerful contributors to the shape of 
metropolitan housing markets.106  Federal, state and local govern-
ments have influence in determining in what communities to place 
publicly funded housing, thus determining whether these programs 
serve to perpetuate racial segregation or promote racial integration.107 
Importantly, this relationship between discrimination and segre-
gation is likely cyclical and symbiotic.  In other words, it would be too 
simple to say that structural segregation causes market discrimina-
tion.  Rather, analyses suggest an interaction between private discrim-
ination and individual choices on the one hand and structural segre-
gation on the other.108  The implication of this data for my argument 
is that because market discrimination is connected in complex ways 
 
106 The federally funded HOPE VI program for instance was created by Congress in 1992 to 
replace one hundred thousand units of “severely distressed” public housing and replace it 
with a combination of new, mixed-income housing and rental vouchers.  See Quality 
Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2518, 2521; Su-
san J. Popkin & Mary K. Cunningham, Beyond the Projects:  Lessons from Public Housing 
Transformation in Chicago, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 96, at 176, 177–
78.  The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC), created in 1986, is the larg-
est single source of funding for the development of low-income rental housing.  See I.R.C. 
§ 42 (2006);  Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, HUDUSER.ORG, http://www.huduser.org/
datasets/lihtc.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2010) (noting that Congress created the 
LIHTC program in 1986).  The program provides about $5 billion annually in tax credits 
and has resulted in the building of about 1.8 million units between 1987 and 2007.  See id.  
The IRS—the federal agency with authority over the program—has so far failed to prom-
ulgate civil rights guidelines for the program.  See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and 
Community Revitalization:  Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1750–51 (2005) (noting the lack of “specific regulatory guidance” 
on fair housing requirements for the tax credit program); Florence Wagman Roisman, 
Mandates Unsatisfied:  The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998) (noting that “the Treasury and state and local 
agencies have failed to impose meaningful bars to discrimination”). 
107 For instance, several empirical studies of the LIHTC reveal that in certain states the hous-
ing “mirrors existing conditions of racial and economic segregation.”  Philip D. Tegeler, 
The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 96, at 197, 202.  The studies also reveal that in several commun-
ities the program is succeeding in promoting racial and economic integration.  See JILL 
KHADDURI ET AL., ARE STATES USING THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT TO ENABLE 
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN TO LIVE IN LOW POVERTY AND RACIALLY INTEGRATED 
NEIGHBORHOODS? 2 (2006), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/LIGHTC_
report_2006.pdf. 
108 See George C. Galster & W. Mark Keeney, Race, Residence, Discrimination, and Economic Op-
portunity:  Modeling the Nexus of Urban Racial Phenomena, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 87, 103 (1988) 
(finding that the size of the black population may “generate either greater white percep-
tions of ‘threat’ and/or greater ‘self-segregation’ tendencies by blacks”).  To be sure, 
more empirical information would be useful in understanding the full dimensions of that 
interaction. 
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with public action, addressing this discrimination will require inter-
vention on multiple fronts. 
In addition, framing the issue of fair housing in terms of private 
market discrimination undersells the political salience and contem-
porary relevance of the fair housing issue.  Since few understand 
themselves as victims of housing discrimination, the fair housing issue 
may appear less pressing, and the work of advocates and the private 
bar given less prominence.  Separating the work of individualized fair 
housing enforcement from advocacy to address the role of state ac-
tors through public programs may contribute to this problem.  
Groups that seek to promote and address questions such as access to 
affordable housing and community revitalization by some assessments 
garner greater political traction and resonance within minority com-
munities.109  By contrast, much of the traditional fair housing en-
forcement structure and, importantly, private bar activity has focused 
on individualized antidiscrimination cases.110  These enforcement ef-
forts are important and potentially effective, but one consequence is 
that groups receiving such funding have historically paid less atten-
tion to the role of state actors in perpetuating discrimination and ex-
clusion in housing, or to form coalitions with groups who work on is-
sues of affordable housing.111 
In short, complaint-driven antidiscrimination enforcement not 
only has a set of practical difficulties, it risks leaving out central insti-
tutional players—state actors—who contribute to interrelated prob-
lems of discrimination and segregation, and who could serve as an 
important lever for addressing fair housing problems. 
 
109 See Sidney, supra note 90, at 206–07 (noting lack of prominence of fair housing issue); id. 
at 210, 213 (arguing that fair housing groups have failed in many respects to form coali-
tions with groups that emphasize affordable housing). 
110 See id. at 210 (discussing fair housing organizations’ focus on individual case processing to 
the exclusion of issues such as affordable housing and regional equity).  Ironically, ac-
cording to this account, federal funding may have directed the work in this way.  The 
funding programs created to incentivize fair housing enforcement encourage a focus on 
discrimination in the private market, and—though the important work of testing plays a 
significant role in some of the work of these organizations—much of this work is driven 
by individual complaints.  See id. at 212–13. 
111 See id. at 203 (arguing that fair housing’s statutory and funding policies “artificially steer[] 
fair housing advocacy away from issues associated with such core realities as racial segre-
gation and the production and location of affordable housing”). 
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III.  UNITED STATES EX REL V. WESTCHESTER AND HARNESSING PUBLIC 
POWER 
One way of understanding United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination 
Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester, then, is as an intervention 
beyond individualized antidiscrimination enforcement.  The case 
stands as a creative unleashing of the underplayed aspect of the 
FHA’s enforcement regime—one that centers on engaging public 
players through conditioned spending, regulatory oversight, and in-
formation sharing to address the institutional arrangements that 
shape discrimination and segregation.  The case points to vigorous 
and creative private bar activity—which has gained steam in recent 
years112—to give meaning to the provisions of the FHA that require 
federal agencies and grantees to administer their housing and urban 
development programs in a “manner affirmatively to further the pur-
poses of th[e FHA].”113  This Part briefly summarizes the case and the 
larger effort that surrounds it, and ultimately in Part IV shows the 
opening the case provides for rethinking how to mobilize public and 
private power to advance fair housing. 
A. United States ex rel. v. Westchester 
The Westchester case arises out of an effort by the Antidiscrimina-
tion Center of Metro New York (ADC) to increase opportunities for 
minorities to live in predominantly white, middle-class communities 
in Westchester County, a county in southern New York.  ADC 
brought their suit against Westchester County114 in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in April 2006.115  For reasons that I explain more ful-
ly below,116 the claim was brought under the False Claims Act (FCA),117 
a Civil War era statute often used today to pursue claims on behalf of 
the Department of Defense and Department of Health and Human 
Services against government contractors alleged to have defrauded 
 
112 See infra notes 155–61 and accompanying text. 
113 See 42 U.S.C §§ 3608(d), (e)(5), 5309(b) (2006) (directing the Secretary of HUD to “ad-
minister the programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a 
manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter”). 
114 Westchester County is a municipal corporation consisting of forty-five separate municipal-
ities.  See Complaint at 4, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. 
v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06 Civ. 2860) 
[hereinafter Complaint].  The suit here implicated only the towns and villages in West-
chester, and not the five larger cities.  See Roberts, supra note 19. 
115 Complaint, supra note 114, at 1. 
116 See infra text accompanying notes 150–51. 
117 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006); Complaint, supra note 114 at 2. 
1216 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:5 
 
the government.118  The FCA includes a whistle-blowing qui tam provi-
sion that allows a third party to bring suit against alleged defrauders 
of the federal government and to then claim a portion of the damag-
es.119  The false claim alleged by the ADC was that Westchester Coun-
ty, in taking $45 million in federal grants for housing development 
between 2000 and 2006,120 falsely certified that it would do so consis-
tently with the FHA, including specifically that it would “affirmatively 
further fair housing.”121 
The group’s claim was that Westchester had failed to comply with 
HUD regulations enforcing AFFH.  At first glance, these regulations 
seem largely procedural in their requirements, but the group—
through this litigation—succeeded in giving them substantive con-
tent.  The regulations require HUD grantees to analyze the “impedi-
ments” to fair housing choice in their communities (AI), to take ac-
tions to overcome these impediments, and to keep records and 
analyses of the relevant actions.122  HUD submitted this information 
in 2000 and 2004, but, the ADC alleged, Westchester’s AI failed to 
discuss racial segregation or discrimination in its communities, or any 
actions it had taken to correct this discrimination.123  The result of 
these false claims, the relators alleged, was to perpetuate segregation 
throughout the county:  creating predominantly white villages and 
towns and predominantly black and Latino cities.124 
 
118 See FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  (2008), http://www.taf.org/
FCA-stats-DoJ-2008.pdf (last updated Nov. 19, 2008) (showing qui tam claims brought on 
behalf of the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Servic-
es). 
119 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(d) (2006) (stating that “[a] person may bring a civil action for a 
violation of section 3729 [of the FCA] for the person and for the United States govern-
ment,” and they may collect a reasonable amount of damages if the government does not 
proceed with the action). 
120 The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides funding to states 
and localities for a range of community development activities including housing.  See 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–21 (2006).  Be-
tween 2000 and 2006, Westchester received $45 million, most of which was from the 
Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG).  See Complaint, supra note 114, 
at 1–2. 
121 See 42 U.S.C § 5304 (2006) (requiring that federal grants “will be conducted and adminis-
tered in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act, and the 
grantee will affirmatively further fair housing”). 
122 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225, 570.601 (2006). 
123 The relators alleged that “on each occasion that Westchester . . . requested or demanded 
payment from the federal government based on having supposedly complied with the 
Fair Housing Act, the Community Development Act, and with its certification-based obli-
gations, it committed a separate violation of the False Claims Act.”  Complaint, at 14. 
124 The ADC relied on the analysis of statistician Andrew Beveridge, a professor at Queens 
College.  Beveridge’s analysis showed that racial isolation was increasing for blacks, and 
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After a period of litigation, the ADC achieved a historic settlement 
in the case.  This occurred first because the district court judge as-
signed to the case, Denise Cote, granted ADC partial summary judg-
ment on the bulk of its AFFH claims.125  According to Judge Cote, 
Westchester had failed to conduct a proper analysis of impediments 
or to demonstrate any actions it had taken to address discrimination 
and segregation in the county.126  Thus, the judge held that Westches-
ter had made false or fraudulent claims in violation of the FCA.127 
The judge deferred for trial the question of whether Westchester 
had knowingly undertaken this false or fraudulent action—an addi-
tional requirement for liability under the FCA.128  But a trial would 
never happen.  Soon after Judge Cote’s summary judgment ruling, 
the newly installed Obama Administration became involved in nego-
tiating a settlement in the case.129  In August 2009, the federal gov-
ernment—the putative plaintiffs in the case—formally intervened in 
the case to help broker a settlement.130  The settlement, which was 
eventually approved by the county government,131 requires Westches-
ter to pay $30 million to the federal government to settle the FCA 
claims,132 $21.6 million of which would be placed in Westchester’s 
HUD account for developing integrated housing in the county.133  
The agreement also requires Westchester to set aside $30 million dol-
 
that this isolation existed regardless of the income level of blacks.  See Initial Expert Re-
port of Andrew Beveridge at ¶¶ 27, 38 United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of 
Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06 
Civ. 2860). 
125 United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
126 Focusing primarily on Westchester’s 2000 and 2004 AI’s, Judge Cote concluded that 
Westchester had “utterly failed to comply with the regulatory requirement that the Coun-
ty perform and maintain a record of its analysis of the impediments to fair housing choice 
in terms of race,” and never performed a survey of local laws and policy, despite the 
County’s full knowledge that it was required to do so.  Id. at 563.  Judge Cote also rejected 
Westchester County’s argument that it had properly used income as a surrogate for race 
in submitting its AI’s in 2000 and 2004, noting that income and race were distinct con-
cepts.  Id. at 564–65. 
127 Id. at 567. 
128 Id. at 568. 
129 See Roberts, supra note 19 (noting that HUD helped broker the current settlement). 
130 See Complaint-In-Intervention of the United States of America, United States ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06 Civ. 2860). 
131 The Westchester Board of Legislators approved the Settlement by a 12–5 vote on Sep-
tember 23, 2009.  See Joshua Brunstein, Westchester Board Approves a Housing-Integration 
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at A29. 
132 See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at ¶ 3, United States ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y. Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548  
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 1:06-cv-2860-DLC) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]. 
133 Id. 
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lars of its own budget to fund housing development projects that fur-
ther fair housing.134  In specific terms, the settlement requires that 
Westchester County build or acquire 750 affordable housing units in 
communities with low minority populations.135  While the settlement 
proposes no racial requirements for occupancy of the units, it re-
quires the County to “affirmatively market” the units to nonwhite 
populations in the county.136 
Consistent with the settlement agreement, the judge also ap-
pointed a Monitor, paid for by the County, to oversee implementa-
tion of the settlement.137  A condition of the settlement is that the 
County submit an implementation plan outlining timetables, specific 
benchmarks, and including a “model ordinance” to be submitted to 
the municipalities in the County in an effort to promote fair hous-
ing.138  The Monitor twice rejected the County’s proposed implemen-
tation plan for failure to include sufficiently specific information, 
eventually approving key aspects of the County’s implementation 
plan in October 2010.139 
B.  A Different Enforcement Story 
As the Westchester plan is implemented, it will no doubt raise a 
host of doctrinal and institutional reform questions, including the 
scope of local government power.  In particular, Westchester’s power 
to compel fair housing reform by the towns and villages within the 
 
134 See id. at ¶¶ 5–6.  Under the settlement, Westchester is also responsible for $2.5 million in 
attorney’s fees to ADC.  See id. at ¶ 4. 
135 See id. at ¶ 7.  The settlement requires the county to build most of the housing in com-
munities in which African Americans are less than 3% of the population and Latinos are 
less than 7%.  A maximum of sixty of the 750 units may be in areas that are up to 7% 
African American and up to 10% Latino.  See id. at ¶ 7(b), (c).  A maximum of sixty out of 
the 750 mandated affordable AFFH units could be built in areas that are no more than 
14% African American and up to 16% Latino.  See id. at ¶ 7(c).  These latter units could 
only be built after 175 of the 630 units in the municipalities with the heaviest white popu-
lations have been built.  See id. 
136 See id. at ¶ 33(e). 
137 See id. at ¶¶ 9–11, 17. 
138 See id. at ¶ 25(a).  The settlement agreement requires that the county submit the initial 
implementation plan within 120 days of the agreement.  See id. at ¶ 18. 
139 After rejecting the first two implementation plans as lacking, the Monitor approved the 
third subject to some revisions.  See Monitor’s Report Regarding Implementation of the 
Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal For the Period of July 7, 2010 
Through October 25, 2010, at 5–6, United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro 
N.Y. Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 1:06-cv-
2860-DLC) (approving “certain aspects of the August 2010 [implementation plan]” but 
continuing “to work with the County and outside experts on other components”). 
June 2011] THE LAST PLANK 1219 
 
county will likely become a central issue in the case.140  Yet, what is 
significant about the case is that it presents an approach to fair hous-
ing enforcement that is markedly different from the standard en-
forcement story provided in Parts I and II.  It is different in its focus 
on state actors (as market players and leverage points for change).  It 
is also different in its conceptualization of the fair housing problem—
as involving questions of access to affordable housing, nondiscrimina-
tion, and structural integration.  Enforcement in the context of AFFH 
has required private groups to press courts, federal agencies, and 
state and local actors to define the provisions as placing a substantive 
duty on government entities that receive federal funds to address bar-
riers to fair housing and to promote integration. 
The Westchester case is not the first attempt by private groups to 
give meaning to the AFFH.  Though not well-defined in the legislative 
history,141 the AFFH provision arose in the context of broad recogni-
tion by members of Congress of the federal government’s contribu-
tion to creating residential segregation.142  Proponents sought the 
provision to encourage the federal government to more aggressively 
combat discrimination in private markets and in federally funded 
 
140 As part of the settlement, the County acknowledged that “it is appropriate for the County 
to take legal action to compel compliance if municipalities hinder or impede the County 
in its performance of such duties, including the furtherance of [the settlement].”  See Set-
tlement Agreement, supra note 132, at 2.  Accordingly, the settlement requires Westches-
ter County to use “all available means as appropriate to address such action or inaction, 
including but not limited to pursuing legal action . . . as appropriate to accomplish the 
purpose of this Stipulation and Order to AFFH.”  See id. at ¶ 7(j). 
141 Similar language first appeared in the Civil Rights Bill introduced by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson in 1966, and was retained when—after a long struggle—Congress eventually 
enacted the FHA in 1968.  But the term is not defined in the statute or committee report.  
For an account of the legislative history, see Florence W. Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering 
Fair Housing In Regional Housing Markets:  The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litiga-
tion, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 338–39 (2007). 
142 See id. at 333, 374–76, 389.  Several members spoke extensively of the need to right the 
federal government’s historic involvement in creating residential segregation, and several 
witnesses and reports before Congress detailed the federal government’s role.  For in-
stance, President Johnson’s Attorney Generals Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark 
testified to the federal role in creating existing patterns of housing discrimination, in par-
ticular by encouraging and requiring restrictive racial covenants in federal insurance 
programs.  See, e.g, Civil Rights:  Hearings on S. 3296, Amendment 561 to S. 3296, S. 1497, S. 
1654, S. 2846, S. 2923, and S. 3170 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 88 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Senate Hearings] (state-
ment of Hon. Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Attorney Gen. of the United States); Civil Rights 
Act of 1967:  Hearings on S. 1026 et al. before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rrights of the H. 
Jud. Comm., 90th Cong. 6, 72 (1967) [hereinafter “1967 House Hearings”] (statement of 
Ramsey Clark, Att’y General of the United States). 
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housing and loan programs,143 as well as affirmatively promote inte-
gration through these federal programs.144 
The executive branch proved unwilling or ineffective at enforcing 
the AFFH provisions in the late 1960s and 1970s,145 but a handful of 
fair housing groups seized on the provision to challenge contempo-
rary and historic federal and state-level decisions that served to pro-
mote and reinforce racial segregation.  These lower courts cases, 
which involved public housing desegregation and urban renewal 
projects, gave important teeth to AFFH, holding that it required the 
federal government to take affirmative steps to remedy past discrimi-
nation,146 and to promote racial integration in selecting sites for af-
fordable housing.147  These cases prompted HUD to issue its first set 
 
143 In House Judiciary Hearings in May 1966 concerning an earlier version of the bill that 
resulted in the FHA of 1968, Congressman Emanuel Celler asked HUD Secretary Robert 
Weaver about the AFFH language.  See 1966 House Hearings, supra note 142, at 1367 
(statement of Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).  The Secre-
tary responded that this provision would give the government power to exclude discrimi-
natory banks from federal funded programs, and favor housing projects that promote in-
tegration.  See id. at 1367 (statement of Robert Weaver, Sec’y, Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. 
Dev.). 
144 See Roisman, supra note 141, at 389 (arguing that “confinement of African-Americans to 
the cities, and the necessity of enabling them to move to the suburbs, was the central 
problem that the ‘affirmatively further’ language was intended to solve”). 
145 Led by HUD Secretary George Romney, the Nixon administration initially sought to inte-
grate the suburbs and predominantly-white communities through subsidies and other in-
itiatives in its homeownership and subsidized housing programs.  But ultimately, the ef-
forts did not go very far as the administration lacked the political will to push the issues of 
integration in the face of resistance from suburban communities.  See CHRISTOPHER 
BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR:  THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO 
DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 102–06 (2006) (discussing HUD’s integration efforts). 
146 See Roisman, supra note 141, at 364–65 (describing cases finding that HUD could be re-
quired to remedy public housing segregation).  In Hills v. Gautreaux (initiated in 1966 be-
fore the FHA), the Seventh Circuit found the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and 
HUD liable under Title VI for creating segregation through discriminatory site selection 
and other practices, and ordered HUD to forge a metropolitan-wide remedy for segrega-
tion.  See Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F. 2d 930, 931, 938–39 (7th Cir. 1974), 
rev’d sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).  When the Supreme Court affirmed 
the metropolitan remedy several years later after the passage of the FHA, HUD cited this 
approach as “consistent with” the duty of HUD to affirmatively further fair housing.  See 
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 301–02.  For accounts of the Gautreaux litigation, see generally 
ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX:  A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HOUSING, 
AND THE BLACK GHETTO (2006), and see also SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 227.  
147 In Shannon v. HUD, the Third Circuit found HUD liable for constructing low-income sub-
sidized housing in an area with already high concentrations of poor minorities, finding 
that doing so would violate HUD’s duty to affirmatively further fair housing in “non-
ghetto areas.”  436 F.2d 809, 816, 819–20 (3rd Cir. 1970).  In NAACP v. HUD, the First 
Circuit held that the duty to affirmatively further fair housing required more than nondi-
scrimination; HUD was to “use its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and 
segregation to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases.”  NAACP, 
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of regulations defining AFFH, which mandated that subsidized hous-
ing programs not compound minority concentration unless necessary 
to meet an overriding housing need.148 
Yet the provision received relatively little court attention outside 
the context of these few cases.  This inattention has started to change 
in recent years as fair housing advocates have brought litigation to 
require state and local grantees to promote integration in other fed-
erally funded programs.149  These initial litigation efforts were not 
wholly successful.   One problem has been that changes in the law of 
implied rights of action have made judicial enforcement of AFFH less 
than clear.  Following the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Gonzaga 
v. Doe,150 some courts have held that the AFFH is not privately enfor-
ceable through an implied right of action theory or using 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.151  Westchester’s doctrinal innovation then is to use the qui tam 
FCA claim in a manner that circumvents the Gonzaga v. Doe problem. 
A second problem has been that courts are not fully resolved on 
the question of whether AFFH stands for a strong antisegregation 
right that can apply to all federal programs.  In the Westchester case, 
 
Boston Chapter v. Sec’y of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987).  According to the First 
Circuit, this required HUD to consider the effect of its housing programs on the “socio-
economic composition of the surrounding area” and required HUD to use its “immense 
leverage . . . to provide adequate desegregated housing.”  Id. at 156 (internal citations 
omitted). 
148 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (c)–(h) (2006) (discussing racial composition requirements 
for public housing sites); Orfield, supra note 106, at 1772–73 (describing regulatory codi-
fications of Shannon and Gautreaux). 
149 In New Jersey, plaintiffs sought to apply Shannon’s requirement to remedy segregation in 
the LIHTC program.  The state appellate court agreed that the state had an enforceable 
AFFH duty, but–deferring to local housing authorities—found this duty had been satis-
fied.  Effectively, the court held that while affirmatively to further might require the local-
ity to consider segregative effects, the requirement was not so robust as to mandate a par-
ticular course of action in response.  See In Re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 5–6, 26 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004) 
[hereinafter Adoption] (rejecting challenge to discrimination in the administration of 
federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit program, finding that housing authority satis-
fied its ‘affirmatively to further’ duty); see also Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization 
Ass’n v. King, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 11 422, 424 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (finding no pri-
vate right of action to enforce AFFH or its implementing regulations). 
150 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).  In Gonzaga, the Court held 7–2 that pro-
visions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) were not pri-
vately enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the relevant FERPA provision lacked 
rights-creating language.  Id. at 275, 290. 
151 See, e.g., Asylum Hill, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 11 at 427–28 (declining to find implied private 
right of action).  On the other hand, in March 2008, a court allowed a similar case to en-
force AFFH to go forward.  See Inclusive Comm. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Hous. & 
Comm. Affairs, No. 308CV-546-3, 2008 WL 5191935, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2008) (de-
nying motion to dismiss on standing grounds). 
1222 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:5 
 
the federal program at issue—the Community Development Block 
Grant program—included relatively detailed requirements on the 
types of fair housing analyses and actions required to satisfy AFFH, 
which likely smoothed the way for the court’s holding.152  By contrast 
other federal housing programs lack such guidance.153  Yet, while it is 
unclear how future courts will respond to claims under the FCA—the 
case puts the state and local grantees regulated by HUD on notice to 
take more concrete and substantive action to enforce AFFH.154 
Moreover, the AFFH enforcement story has not been limited to 
courts.  Even before the Westchester case, nonlitigation advocacy at the 
state and local advocacy aimed to encourage state and local grantees 
to comply with AFFH by promoting integration in their federally 
funded programs and by addressing both public and private barriers 
to fair housing in their communities.  As a result, some states that re-
ceive federal funds have now adopted explicit requirements to pro-
mote integration in the important federal low-income housing tax 
credit program.155 
At the federal administrative level, fair housing groups in recent 
years have encouraged federal agencies to clarify AFFH requirements 
applicable to federal grantees, and to better police whether federal 
grantees are promoting housing choice and integration in their pro-
grams.156  For instance, groups have sought, with some success, to get 
the federal government to issue detailed requirements about their 
 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 121–22. 
153 For instance, one of fair housing’s most important programs—the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit Program which is the largest federal program to create rental housing—lacks 
any civil rights regulatory guidance.  See Orfield, supra note 106, at 1750 (noting lack of 
such guidance for the LIHTC program). 
154 See infra text accompanying notes 160–62 (discussing HUD enforcement efforts following 
the Westchester case). 
155 Some states have adopted rules that prohibit the construction of tax-credit developments 
in neighborhoods of high minority and poverty concentration (unless the developments 
are pursuant to a formal community revitalization plan which can serve to lower race and 
poverty concentration in distressed communities).  See POVERTY RACE RESEARCH ACTION 
COUNCIL, BUILDING OPPORTUNITY:  CIVIL RIGHTS BEST PRACTICES IN THE LOW INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 6–7 (2008) (discussing requirements for allocation of tax 
credits in North Carolina, Texas, Alabama, and New Hampshire); id. at 7–8 (discussing 
the use of scoring proposals to prevent economic and racial segregation).  I am familiar 
with the work of the Poverty Race Research Action Council in part because I sit on their 
board. 
156 See Tegeler, supra note 107, at 202 (describing advocacy efforts at the federal level to 
bring the “LIHTC program into conformity with the Fair Housing Act”); Letter from Jo-
seph Rich, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law et al. to Shaun Donovan, U.S. 
Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev. (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.prrac.org/full_text. 
php?text_id=1217&item_id=11375&newsletter_id=0&header=Current%20Projects (urg-
ing HUD to promote fair housing in the LIHTC program). 
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fair housing duties to state and local grantees receiving funds under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009—commonly 
known as the stimulus.157  Groups have also filed a petition for rule-
making, which awaits resolution, asking the IRS—the agency that 
oversees the low-income housing tax credit program—to promulgate 
specific regulations to affirmatively further fair housing in that pro-
gram.158 
Most sweeping is the current effort spurred in large part by the 
successes in the Westchester case to reformulate the guidelines govern-
ing AFFH.159  While this process is still underway, fair housing and civ-
il rights groups are encouraging HUD to strengthen regulations to 
provide clearer and more rigorous metrics for advancing fair hous-
ing, and to better monitor federal grantees.160  In the wake of the 
Westchester case, HUD already has exhibited greater interest in enforc-
ing the AFFH provision.  Partially in response to a complaint by a fair 
housing group, HUD has withheld $1.7 billion in CDBG funds to 
 
157 The funding notice delineated the requirements of grantees receiving funds under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s Homeless Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing 
program, which provides $1.5 billion for communities to prevent homelessness among at-
risk individuals and families, and funds to help those who become homeless transition to 
stable housing.  See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
tit. XII, 123 Stat. 115, 221.  HUD delineated the types of specific actions that meet that 
duty, including affirmatively marketing programs to people with disabilities; providing 
fair housing counseling and referral to fair housing agencies; and recruiting landlords 
and service providers in a range of communities so as to promote housing choice.  See 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice of Allocations, Application Procedures, and Re-
quirements for Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program Grantees un-
der the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Docket No. FR-5307-N-01, 
available at http://www.hudhre.info/documents/HPRP_Notice_03-19-09.pdf (Mar. 19, 
2009) (outlining requirements for funding). 
158 See Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Petition for Rulemaking Involving 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.42-17 Qualified Allocation Plan 5–6 (proposing rule requiring IRS to ensure LIHTC 
allocation plans further fair housing). 
159 See Notice of Informal Meeting, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing and Fair Housing 
Plans, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,456 (Jul. 13, 2009) (announcing informal meeting to collect public 
views on proposed rule to implement AFFH);  Hearing on the H.R. 476 Housing Fairness Act 
of 2009 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Jan. 20, 2010) (Statement of John D. Trasviña, 
Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity), at 1–2, available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_7752.pdf (describing 
rulemaking process to better promote integration and social services);  Craig Gurian & 
Michael Allen, Making Real the Desegregating Promise of the Fair Housing Act:  “Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing” Comes of Age, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 560, 569 (2010) (noting 
that the Westchester case helped spur current rulemaking). 
160 See, e.g., Reforming HUD’s Regulations to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing, THE OPPORTUNITY 
AGENDA PUBLIC POL’Y BRIEFS, Mar. 2010, available at http://opportunityagenda. 
org/files/field_file/2010.03ReformingHUDRegulations.pdf (providing recommenda-
tions for a new rule that would strengthen enforcement of AFFH). 
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Texas for failing to adhere to AFFH requirements.161  In addition, in 
November 2009, HUD threatened to terminate federal funds to a 
county grantee, leading the county to alter rules that would have im-
peded fair housing.162 
In short these efforts employ a range of different strategies to 
strengthen the meaning of the AFFH duties that attach to federal 
funds, and to encourage a more vigorous federal role in securing 
compliance by federal grantees.  In Part IV, I present the implications 
of this approach for the FHA’s dominant model of public and private 
power, and for generating a new frame in which to advance fair hous-
ing. 
IV.  RETHINKING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER 
My suggestion is that while the FHA instantiated an emphasis on 
individual housing discrimination and weak public and private me-
chanisms for enforcing that discrimination, the FHA has also pro-
vided, through the AFFH provisions, an important mechanism for us-
ing federal funds to coerce and incentivize state and local 
governments to promote fair housing.  This has implications for do-
minant conceptions of how to deploy public and private power to ad-
vance fair housing. 
As we have seen, the prime model of civil rights enforcement in 
housing mobilizes public power by creating a private attorney general 
and an administrative enforcement scheme to address claims of dis-
crimination.  Under this scheme private power is mobilized to bring 
claims in court and in administrative agencies.  The AFFH regime has 
a set of features that are distinct from that model in that it:  (1) dep-
loys a different set of federal administrative tools (i.e., regulatory 
guidance and conditioned spending); and (2) relies on private power 
to mobilize these tools not simply through private litigation but 
through formal and informal agency action.  As this Part shows, fo-
cusing on these aspects of the FHA’s enforcement regime sheds a dif-
 
161 See Rhiannon Meyers, State Plan for Ike Money Draws 2nd Complaint, GALVESTON COUNTY 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2009) http://galvestondailynews.com/story/148454/ (discussing 
withholding of disaster recovery funding). 
162 See Gurian & Allen,  supra note 159, at 569 (describing HUD’s threat as involving $10 mil-
lion in federal funds to the Parish); Chris Kirkham, Council Rescinds Ballot Measure; St. Ber-
nard Backs Off Apartments Vote, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.nola.com/
politics/index.ssf/2009/11/st_bernard_parish_council_back.html (reporting that HUD 
threatened to cut-off federal CDBG funding for St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, due to the 
racial discriminatory effect of proposed restrictions on multifamily occupancy).  
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ferent light on housing’s enforcement limitations, and suggests an 
important leverage point for surmounting existing problems. 
A. Broadening the Tools of Public Power 
First, AFFH, which is primarily a directive to federal agencies, mo-
bilizes public power to shape the activities of federal agencies, as well 
as the requirements on federal grantees.  As we have seen, the specif-
ic duty of AFFH is open-ended in many ways, and is formed through 
court and agency action as well as through definition by governments 
and stakeholders at the state and local levels.163  But the significance 
here is that AFFH allows federal agencies to place a set of duties on 
grantees.164  These grantees have tremendous power to shape housing 
markets through the decisions they make in selecting sites for the de-
velopment of subsidized housing, and through the steps they take to 
address public and private barriers to fair housing choice as they de-
velop those programs.165 
Indeed, there is much to suggest that civil rights gains in employ-
ment depend on similar uses of federal power.166  As accounts in the 
employment context make clear, crucial fair employment gains re-
sulted not simply from individualized, court enforcement but from a 
broad range of requirements placed on federal grantees. 
The central formal powers that the 1964 Civil Rights Act granted 
to the EEOC were like those granted to HUD, limited.  As discussed 
above, civil rights proponents sought a strong agency to enforce anti-
discrimination laws through its own cease-and-desist power.167  In-
 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 149–62. 
164 While the FHA is not a spending clause statute, the AFFH operates much like conditional 
spending requirements that exist in other civil rights area.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 
(2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin in any 
“program or activity” receiving federal financial assistance). 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 99–107. 
166 This is particularly true of Title VI, which is not discussed here.  Many researchers credit 
Title VI for advances in school desegregation.  See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 97–100 (1991) (discussing role of 
Title VI in inducing school districts to desegregate, and showing that courts became more 
effective in desegregation after the enactment of Title VI); see also JOEL F. HANDLER, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM:  A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 114–15 (1978) (arguing that the support of the federal executive through Title 
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as through DOJ litigation “quickened the pace of 
[school] integration” over law reform efforts but noting that because of the executive’s 
“gradualist approach,” “progress was still slow”). 
167 See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII:  Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 453 (1966) (discussing 
legislative proposals for enforcement power of Civil Rights Commission); Robert C. Lie-
berman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy:  The EEOC and Civil Rights Enforcement, 1–2 
(Colum. Univ. Dep’t of Political Science, Working Paper, Jan. 2010) (“As originally con-
1226 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:5 
 
stead, the EEOC’s power was limited to investigating claims and me-
diating disputes, and private individuals were required to file charges 
with the EEOC as a prerequisite to litigation.168  The EEOC from its 
inception struggled to process individual cases, immediately facing 
immense backlogs that persist until today.169 
Yet the EEOC provides an important lesson about the use of ad-
ministrative power to reshape employment markets.  Shortly after the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC launched its 
strategy of requiring employees to collect information (EEO-1 forms) 
on the racial, ethnic and gender composition of their employment 
forces, interpreting Title VII broadly to permit this type of data col-
lection.170  These and other strategies were in fact explicit responses 
to a problem similar to the one that arises today in housing:  the per-
ceived limitations of the EEOC’s ability to process individual com-
plaints.171  This data became a powerful tool in reforming the hiring 
practices of entire industries and specific firms, and in promoting af-
firmative action as a corrective.172  The EEOC used this information to 
target lagging employers, providing them technical assistance on how 
to improve their hiring practices.173  And, despite its limited formal 
powers, the EEOC could threaten to launch an investigation or share 
information with litigating public interest organizations (with whom 
 
ceived by civil rights advocates, the EEOC was to have full regulatory powers, particularly 
the power to issue binding cease-and-desist orders to employers.”). 
168 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(b), (e)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (2009)) (providing that private individuals must file 
a charge with the EEOC and can sue in court only after the EEOC issues them a “right to 
sue” letter).  In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to grant the EEOC authority to sue 
private employees in its own name, although the EEOC infrequently invokes this power.  
See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
169 See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  POLITICS, CULTURE AND 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 122 (1996) (quoting Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense 
and Education Fund that the EEOC was “‘weak, cumbersome probably unworkable,’” and 
describing the early years of the EEOC as “characterized by disorganization”); Lieber-
man, supra note 167, at 16–17 (discussion of the EEOC’s backlog of individual com-
plaints). 
170 See Lieberman, supra note 167, at 27 (describing the EEOC’s data collection strategy as a 
liberal interpretation of its statutory authority under Title VII). 
171 See SKRENTNY, supra note 169, at 124–25 (noting that by 1969 it was “clear” to EEOC ob-
servers that “responding to the complaints of properly abstract citizens was a blueprint for 
failure”). 
172 See GRAHAM, supra note 71, at 193–97, 239–43; Lieberman, supra note 167, at 27 (noting 
that the data would serve as a “powerful weapon[]” in taking actions against offending 
employers).  As Graham has documented, the EEOC realized as early as the late 1960s 
that this information would help promote affirmative action.  See GRAHAM, supra note 71, 
at 239. 
173 See Lieberman, supra note 167, at 27 (stating that the reports and data could “form the 
basis for ‘technical assistance’ programs”). 
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the EEOC was actively cooperating), and thus prod employers into 
adopting affirmative action plans.174  It also published guidelines on 
seniority, occupational tests, and other potentially discriminatory 
practices to influence employers.175 
In housing, this account suggests, a similarly vigorous use of fed-
eral power has struggled to emerge, even with the opening provided 
in AFFH.  This is despite the fact that the AFFH seems to provide a 
more explicit statutory call for the use of federal agency power than 
in Title VII, a reflection of congressional recognition of the deep 
connections between federal actors and state and local players, and 
the need to explicitly engage federal agencies and funding mechan-
isms in reshaping public markets.176 
B. Private and Public Forms of Mobilization 
A second feature of the AFFH is the complexity of the interaction 
between courts and agencies and private and public actors required 
to give the provision regulatory teeth.  This complexity is manifest in 
the Westchester case itself.  Styled as a qui tam action under the FCA, it 
requires privately-initiated court litigation to enforce a duty that fed-
eral grantees owe to the federal government, but which the federal 
government has failed to enforce.  The case is settled after the federal 
government decides to intervene to broker a deal—its willingness to 
do so likely shaped by advocacy pressure.177 
As Part III showed, the FCA claim allows an alternate route to pri-
vate enforcement through 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the usual route for pri-
vate enforcement of civil rights statutes.178  The point here is not to 
revisit the Supreme Court precedents that make private enforcement 
of AFFH through an implied right of action or through 42 U.S.C. 
 
174 See id. (noting that the threat of investigations or lawsuits could be used to negotiate af-
firmative action agreements); see also SKRENTNY, supra note 169, at 127–39 (describing the 
development of affirmative action through the use of EEO-1 forms as well as the Depart-
ment of Labor’s Office of Contract Compliance’s use of Executive Order 11246 to pro-
mote affirmative action for federal contractors).  As Skrentny and others have shown, 
these federal agency strategies responded to limitations in the individual enforcement 
regime similar to those that exist in housing.  See id. at 124–25. 
175 See GRAHAM, supra note 71, at 250–53 (detailing EEOC’s regulatory enforcement of Title 
VII to challenge seniority, testing, and other practices with a disparate impact); Alfred W. 
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:  Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment 
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60, 73–74 (1972) (describing the development of 
EEOC guidelines governing disparate impact). 
176 See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. 
177 See Westchester County Fair Housing Update, supra note 19 (describing letter signed by more 
than fifty state and local fair housing groups to encourage HUD to broker a settlement). 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 150–51. 
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§ 1983 difficult.179  Rather it is to suggest the AFFH does not fit into 
the standard private attorney general model and that as a practical 
matter the route to enforcement has meant actions in courts as well 
as agencies.  This limits the ability to rely solely on courts for articula-
tion of these rights, but at the same times courts have provided a po-
werful place for defining these duties—with Westchester providing the 
latest example. 
In the end, what we call AFFH “enforcement” emerges out of:  (1) 
judicial willingness to spell out requirements in privately-initiated liti-
gation;180 (2) agency clarification and enforcement of rules on gran-
tees;181 (3) private action outside of courts to mobilize such agency ac-
tion;182 and (4) state and local grantees’ interest in and capacity to 
pursue civil rights goals.183 
Noting these features does not announce the current AFFH en-
forcement process as an ideal one.  Perhaps more vigorous enforce-
ment of the “right” would be achieved better if AFFH and its regula-
tions could be enforced relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or through an 
implied right of action theory.184  The important point is that the 
same mechanisms that give AFFH its power (that it operates as a di-
rective to federal agencies and grantees and not as a grant of litiga-
tion power to individuals), also means that enforcement requires 
more complex forms of public and private mobilization. 
C.  Towards Strengthening the FHA’s Last Plank 
Whether this mobilization of private and public power will in the 
end promote integration and housing choice remains to be seen.  At 
the federal level, commitment to enforcing AFFH is likely to vary de-
 
179 See generally Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Note, Opening Doors to Fair Housing:  Enforcing the 
Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2135, 2136 (2010) (arguing that the AFFH provisions should be enforceable in 
court using 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  For a critique of the Supreme Court’s approach to im-
plied rights of action in civil rights cases, see Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attor-
ney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 195–96 (2003). 
180 See supra notes 125–28, 147 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra text accompanying note 122 (describing rules governing current grantees); text 
accompanying notes 159–60 and accompanying text (noting current rulemaking efforts). 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60 (noting involvement of groups in current 
rulemaking). 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 155 (describing state initiatives to promote integration 
and further fair housing in low-income housing tax credit program). 
184 See Collins, supra note 179, at 2136 (arguing that private enforcement through 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 would improve enforcement of the provisions). 
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pending on the President in office,185 and (given the practical difficul-
ties in bringing court action) even private forms of mobilization 
might be insufficient to surmount agency inefficacy.  Without mini-
mizing these problems, this Part concludes by mapping the promise 
that renewed emphasis on AFFH nevertheless holds for achieving fair 
housing and, even, for the beleaguered politics of the movement. 
1. Leveraging Connections 
First, the AFFH approach has implications for advancing fair 
housing in private and public markets.  For one, as we have seen, 
public decisions interact with private markets.  When AFFH receives 
attention from housing commentators, it is typically around its poten-
tial to promote integration in federally funded and subsidized hous-
ing programs.186  Yet, as shown in Part II, public and private markets 
for housing are connected in important ways.187  And, publicly funded 
programs are major participants in the overall housing market.188  A 
significant feature of how the Westchester court (relying on administra-
tive regulations) interprets AFFH is to require federal actors and 
grantees to take affirmative steps not only to dismantle publicly 
created barriers to addressing fair housing, but those that exist in pri-
vate markets by affirmatively marketing new housing to racial and 
ethnic minorities, conducting educational outreach on fair housing 
laws and compliance, and providing mobility counseling and services 
to promote access to affordable housing.189  The hope is that using 
federal funds to encourage integration and housing choice will pro-
duce changes in residential patterns generally, and help reduce pri-
 
185 See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:  Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 414–17 (2010) (noting that 
commitments to enforcing civil rights vary across administrations).  Of course, this prob-
lem of political variation extends beyond civil rights enforcement.  See Terry M. Moe, Reg-
ulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 207–21 (1982) 
(analyzing the effect of presidential administrations on enforcement activities of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal 
Trade Commission). 
186 See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise:  Ending Racial Discrimination and 
Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 927–28 (2005) (arguing that 
HUD fails to affirmatively further fair housing in the LIHTC program). 
187 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, supra note 132, at 23, 26–27 (describing Westchester’s 
duties under AFFH as requiring not only the creation of affordable housing, but affirma-
tive marketing and removal of source of income and other barriers to housing choice). 
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vate manifestations of prejudice that fuel steering, discrimination and 
segregation.190 
Thus, federal, state, and local actors might develop rules that re-
quire the siting of affordable housing to encourage integration.  Pub-
lic actors might also encourage integration by providing housing 
counseling and referrals, and recruiting landlords from a range of 
neighborhoods to participate in publicly financed programs.191  En-
gagement of public actors also draws on other facets of public power, 
including the ability of public actors to gather and analyze empirical 
data on private market discrimination; to map levels of segregation 
and racial variations in access to resources such as employment and 
transportation; and to review and strengthen laws, regulations and 
administrative policies to better promote housing choice.192 
For instance, the Westchester settlement required the County to 
“promote, through the County Executive, legislation currently pend-
ing before the Board of Legislators to ban ‘source-of-income’ discrim-
ination in housing.”193  Discrimination based on source-of-income can 
pose a barrier to fair housing choice and integration for people re-
ceiving funds from federal voucher programs, known as Section 8,194 
which subsidizes rents for qualifying low-income individuals.  By some 
assessments such source of income discrimination is “widespread,” 
and interacts with racial discrimination to limit housing opportunities 
for low-income people,195 and several states and localities have 
enacted legislative efforts in recent years to address the problem.196   
 
190 See supra note 103 (discussing linkages between structural segregation and private preju-
dice). 
191 These examples draw on HUD’s recent requirements for grantees in several programs 
recently expanded by the Stimulus Act.  See supra note 157 (describing funding notice for 
grantees receiving funds under the Stimulus Act’s Homeless Prevention and Rapid Re-
Housing Program). 
192 Though framed in precatory terms, HUD’s informal guidance on AFFH encourages these 
types of practices by state and localities.  See U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., 1 FAIR 
HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, 2–7 (defining the analysis of impediments), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf (last visited May 11, 2011); id. at 3-11 
to -14 (providing examples of state analyses of impediments and actions that might be 
taken to overcome them). 
193 Settlement Agreement, supra note 132, at ¶ 33(g). 
194 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006) (low-income housing assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(a)–(b) 
(2008) (providing income requirements for Section 8 eligibility). 
195 See National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, The Future of Fair Hous-
ing, CIVILRIGHTS.ORG (Dec. 2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/
fairhousing/emerging.html (finding that discrimination against Section 8 tenants is 
“more pronounced” for black voucher holders). 
196 See POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, KEEPING THE PROMISE:  PRESERVING AND 
ENHANCING HOUSING MOBILITY IN THE SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM, 
app. at B (Philip Tegeler et al eds., 2005), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/
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Relatedly, the AFFH approach has the potential to respond to the 
fragmented nature of the real estate industry.  If the problem with 
housing’s private enforcement regime is, in part, an inability to target 
large institutional players who can leverage broader market reform, 
government actors provide one entry point—much like efforts to tar-
get large industry players and particular segments of the employment 
industry.197 
2. Revitalizing Politics 
Second, greater emphasis on AFFH has the potential to revitalize 
the politics of fair housing.  Emerging or renewed interest by state 
and local fair housing groups is already evident in the range of strat-
egies described in Part III that private groups are employing to har-
ness the power of AFFH.198  In addition to the ADC, the group that 
brought the Westchester case, fair housing groups in New York, Minne-
sota, and Texas have in recent years used litigation and other advoca-
cy tools as a mechanism for encouraging greater federal enforcement 
of the provision, as well as prodding states and localities to comply 
with their obligations under the statute.199  Fair housing groups across 
the nation prodded HUD to pursue the Westchester settlement,200 
and they are active players in the ongoing effort to strengthen HUD’s 
AFFH rules.201 
To the extent that commentators characterize housing advocacy 
as focused on individual, antidiscrimination enforcement202 and less 
on the public, structural dimensions of the fair housing problem, this 
suggests an important emphasis in the work of fair housing groups. 
 
Source_of_Income_Summary.pdf (last visited May 11, 2011) (listing more than twelve 
states and thirty-five localities with laws prohibiting discrimination based on source of in-
come). 
197 See SKRENTNY, supra note 169, at 124–30 (describing those efforts). 
198 See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
199 See Tegeler, supra note 107, at 202 (describing advocacy efforts to enforce AFFH at the 
federal level). 
200 See supra text accompanying note 177. 
201 See Written Statement of John D. Trasviña, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal 
Opportunity), at 1–2, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc? 
id=DOC_7752.pdf (discussing the involvement of private civil society groups in the ongo-
ing rulemaking process). 
202 Mara Sidney, for instance has argued that groups on the whole devote little attention to 
the “complex task of achieving racial integration through affirmative strategies or to re-
gional inequities in the provision of affordable housing.”  Sidney, supra note 90, at 210.  
But Sidney also has extensively documented the work of specific fair housing groups that 
take a broader lens.  See, e.g., id. at 219–21 (describing promising fair housing advocacy in 
Minnesota to address issues of affordable housing, regional equity, and housing choice). 
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An interest by fair housing groups in promoting fair housing in 
federally subsidized housing programs also provides a promising set 
of linkages to advocacy groups concerned about affordable housing.  
These new linkages provide an opportunity to connect the work of 
community development groups, which have sought to expand af-
fordable housing within existing minority communities, to civil rights 
groups interested also in creating opportunities for minorities to live 
in traditionally low-minority regions.  The perceived differences of 
these two approaches risks generating conflicts,203 but it also presents 
opportunities to harmonize the two approaches in ways that advance 
affordable housing and fair housing goals.  For instance, fair housing 
and urban community development groups have partnered in litiga-
tion and advocacy efforts, crafting plans to remove barriers to creat-
ing federally funded low-income housing in majority-white suburbs 
while also creating housing in the city to contribute to community re-
vitalization, and economic and racial integration.204   
Finally, an emphasis on the role of public actors in creating segre-
gation and in removing discriminatory housing barriers powerfully 
shifts away from the narrative of individual preference that typically 
accompanies fair housing.205  Highlighting the ongoing role of the 
state in shaping housing choice and constructing residential segrega-
tion reveals that the racial boundaries that one may think of as natu-
ral are in fact created by state policy, and allows questioning of the 
seemingly private “choices” that emerge from those boundaries.  A 
focus on how federal, state and local government actors structure the 
racial makeup of neighborhoods might in this way invite participa-
tion from civil rights and civil society groups that have previously 
shied away from fair housing. 
None of this is to suggest that a focus on AFFH is a panacea for 
achieving fair housing.  This will require sustained interest by federal 
actors and effective forms of mobilization by private civil society 
groups.  Yet, the AFFH approach expands the locations in which to 
 
203 See Orfield, supra note 106, at 1784–89 (detailing conflicts between developers of low-
income housing and civil rights groups on the one hand, and urban community devel-
opment organizations who see creating affordable housing as key to revitalizing poor ur-
ban communities). 
204 See, e.g., Kenneth Zimmerman, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and Civil Rights 
Law:  Updating the Fight for Residential Integration, in NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING 
COALITION, THE NIMBY REPORT 24, 27 (2004) (describing position of amici housing or-
ganizations in New Jersey litigation that LIHTC programs must promote suburban hous-
ing opportunities as well as contribute to urban revitalization), available at http://www. 
nlihc.org/detail/article_list.cfm?topic=40. 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 117–20. 
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advance fair housing and, one hopes, injects some optimism in a de-
bate often framed by despair. 
CONCLUSION 
 In the end, this Article aims to reframe the debate over the seem-
ing exceptionalism of fair housing by providing a richer understand-
ing of how civil rights regimes utilize public and private power to 
achieve statutory ends.  Civil rights enforcement depends not simply 
on harnessing private power to create a strong individual enforce-
ment regime, but on private mobilization of a broad range of state 
powers.  As this Article suggests, the case for greater mobilization of 
state power to advance fair housing is particularly strong given the 
role of federal spending in driving racial living patterns and the op-
erational limitations of individual enforcement.  As this Article has 
argued, the Westchester case both reflects and invites a renewed focus 
on the AFFH provisions of the FHA.  The case deserves attention for 
successfully exploiting the statutory opening provided in the FHA, 
which—despite the significant limitations of its individual enforce-
ment regime—provided in AFFH a powerful tool for harnessing fed-
eral power.  The ultimate significance of this case is that it sits atop a 
larger strategy by private actors—taking place before courts, agencies, 
and state and local governments—to prod public actors to advance 
the nondiscrimination and integration goals of the FHA.  The West-
chester case should prompt additional examinations of how to better 
deploy AFFH to advance fair housing.  In that vein, fair housing 
commentators will have to pay close attention to the proposed new 
HUD regulations clarifying the AFFH and to the implementation of 
the remedy in the Westchester case.  My aim here is to give AFFH a 
more prominent place in discussions of fair housing, while acknowl-
edging that a multitude of strategies will be required to achieve fair 
and integrated housing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
